Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis by Prenkert, Jamie D





ABSTRACT: In Smith v. City of Jackson, the Supreme Court applied to 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act one of its decisions interpreting 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which Congress had overridden  
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.  It treated Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, dealing with disparate impact theory and burdens of proof, as a 
binding interpretation of the ADEA, despite that Congress expressed 
disapproval of Wards Cove.  The Court relied on two interpretive 
approaches to arrive at this result:  the presumption that identical language 
in the ADEA and Title VII should be interpreted consistently and the strong 
presumption of statutory stare decisis.  This convergence of circumstances 
led to the odd result of duplicating the congressionally disfavored Wards 
Cove interpretation. 
I use the comic book story of Bizarro, Superman’s imperfect duplicate, 
as an allegory for the Smith Court's flawed invocation of statutory stare 
decisis to duplicate Wards Cove, labeling it Bizarro statutory stare decisis.  
None of the justifications for the regular presumption of statutory stare 
decisis supports the result in Smith.  Furthermore, Bizarro statutory stare 
decisis interferes with the proper balance of power between Congress and 
the Court and implicates the countermajoritarian difficulty of elevating the 
Court’s interpretations over Congress’s expressed preferences.  The paper 
explores other contexts in which Bizarro statutory stare decisis could wreak 
havoc.  
Finally, I present an alternative to Bizarro statutory stare decisis.  In 
situations like Smith, the Court should not treat an overridden interpretation 
as binding precedent, but should interpret the statute before it as a matter of 
first impression.  In doing so, an overridden interpretation should not be 
duplicated without clear textual, purposive, or historical evidence that the 
overridden interpretation is more appropriate this time around.  The paper 
concludes by applying this alternative to Smith and explaining why Wards 
Cove should never have been revived. 
 
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.  B.A Anderson 
University, 1995; J.D. Harvard Law School, 1998.  Copyright 2006 Jamie Darin Prenkert.  
All rights reserved.   
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“[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two statutes having similar 
purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is 
appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same 
meaning in both statutes.”   
--Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
 
“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the coverage of Title VII, 
they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination.  
Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical 
language remains applicable to the ADEA.”  
--Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) 
 




In Smith v. City of Jackson,1 the Supreme Court of the United States 
relied on, incorporated, and applied a prior decision which had been 
overridden2 by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the “1991 Act”).3
It treated Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,4 an opinion interpreting Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”),5 as binding precedent for 
fashioning the disparate impact theory of recovery6 under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”).7 Justice Stevens, 
writing for the Court in Smith, used language evoking the doctrine of 
 
1 544 U.S. 228 (2005). 
2 In this paper, I use the terms “override,” “overriding,” and “overridden” as it is used 
in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 332 n.1 (1991) [hereinafter, Eskridge, Overriding](“This article will 
use the term “override” to mean any time Congress reacts consciously to, and modifies a 
statutory interpretation decision.”).  In contrast, “overrule,” “overruling,” or “overruled,” as 
used in this paper and by Eskridge, refers to Supreme Court reversal of its prior statutory 
interpretation decision.  See William K. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 
GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overruling]. 
3 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
4 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
5 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
6 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  See also infra Part I for a 
general overview of the disparate impact theory of discrimination under federal anti-
discrimination laws. 
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). 
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enhanced statutory stare decisis,8 which the Court often applies to its 
statutory interpretation decisions.9 Based on the presumption that ADEA 
language that was “derived in haec verba” from Title VII should be 
interpreted the same as Title VII, the court relied on its Title VII 
interpretations to interpret the ADEA.10 Because Congress did not amend 
the ADEA in response to Wards Cove as it had Title VII, the Court treated 
that congressional inaction as an adoption of the Wards Cove interpretation 
for the ADEA.11 Yet, this was no normal implementation of statutory stare 
decisis.  It was at best an imperfect duplicate, sharing some characteristics 
with the traditional form, but mutated and problematic.  As such, the 
statutory stare decisis employed in Smith bears a striking metaphorical 
resemblance to the comic book character Bizarro.  Smith has introduced a 
new doctrine to the statutory interpretation milieu:  Bizarro statutory stare 
decisis. 
In the Superman comic series, Bizarro is a recurring character.12 A
likely homage to Frankenstein’s monster,13 Bizarro is an imperfect replica 
of Superman, created by a faulty “duplicating ray.”14 Bizarro’s looks, 
dress, and abilities resemble Superman.15 He also shares some of 
 
8 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the 
coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age 
discrimination.  Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical 
language remains applicable to the ADEA.”). 
9 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 319 (2005) (describing the doctrine of statutory stare decisis). 
10 Smith, 544 U.S. at 234. 
11 Id. at 240. 
12 What follows is an overly-simplified version of the Bizarro mythos, relying mostly 
on the “Silver Age” incarnation of Bizarro.  As with most comic book characters, Bizarro’s 
appearances in various comic book series over the years create a multi-layered and 
complex (as well as arguably internally contradictory) biography.  I hope true fans of the 
Superman comic books will allow me to simplify and streamline the story a bit.  In return, I 
hope I have not butchered it too badly in the simplification. 
13 See generally MARY SHELLEY, FRANKENSTEIN (Simon & Schuster 2004) (1818). 
14 In his many incarnations, Bizarro is typically created by someone (e.g., Lex Luthor 
or a scientist acquaintance) shooting Superman with a “duplicating ray,” either accidentally 
or purposefully.  See, e.g., Otto Binder, Superboy, in THE GREATEST SUPERMAN STORIES 
EVER TOLD 115-17 (John Byrne and Mike Gold eds., 1987) (Professor Dalton creates 
Bizarro by accidentally hitting Superboy with his malfunctioning “duplicator ray”).  The 
duplicating ray creates a copy of Superman, but Bizarro is an “imperfect duplicate.”  He 
often is depicted with a pasty complexion, angular rock-like features, and wearing a copy 
of the traditional Superman outfit (though the “S” emblem on his chest is often backwards).  
See Superman Super Site, Bizarro, http://www.supermansupersite.com/bizzarro.html (Last 
visited Aug. 29, 2006). 
15 The many appearances of Bizarro in the Superman comics share a few common 
threads.  One is his odd grammar.  Bizarro typically uses only the accusative case pronouns 
“me,” “him,” “her,” and “them” and conjugates verbs incorrectly. See Binder, supra note 
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Superman’s memories and sensibilities.16 In his early comic book 
appearances, Bizarro is not the opposite of Superman.17 He is not evil; he is 
simply a mutation.  He has elements of Superman, but he is imperfect.18 
From this origin, the word Bizarro has developed a distinct modern 
usage as a descriptor.  It refers to an imperfect version or mutation of 
something.  Though the “Bizarro” version shares aspects of the original, it 
is not the original.  And, usually, it is seriously flawed.19 
Like the Bizarro character, the origin of Bizarro statutory stare decisis is 
the result of an odd convergence of circumstances. In general, where the 
ADEA and Title VII have identical language, the Court will treat a decision 
interpreting one as a binding interpretation of the other.20 This is where the 
 
14 passim. Another is the origin of the name “Bizarro.” Always, shortly after his creation, 
someone describes him as “bizarre.”  Superman Home Page, Superman: Special Reports: 
Bizarro, http://www.supermanhomepage.com/comics/comics.php?topic=special-
reports/bizarro (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).  In the original Superboy comic, Superboy 
comments, “Gosh, that creature is bizarre.”  To that, Bizarro responds, “Him call me . . . 
Bizarro.  Is . . . Is that my name?”  See Binder, supra note 14, at 117.  
16 For instance, in his initial appearance in Superboy, Bizarro tries to go “home” to the 
Kent farm, but feels rejected when his “mom” asks him to leave.  Id. at 120.  Bizarro also 
pines for Lois Lane, as does Superman, and kidnaps her.  Lois is saved when she turns the 
duplicating ray on herself and creates Bizarro-Lois.  See Superman Home Page, supra note 
15. 
17 Readers familiar with the television series Seinfeld will recall the episode in which 
Elaine meets a group of three friends who are, in many respects, the opposite of her friends 
Jerry, George, and Kramer.  Jerry surmises that Elaine’s new friends are the “Bizarro” 
version of himself, George and Kramer.  See Seinfeld:  The Bizarro Jerry (NBC television 
broadcast October 3, 1996).  A short video clip from the episode, including a reference to 
“Bizarro world” by Elaine can be found at 
http://www.sonypictures.com/tv/shows/seinfeld/site/player/player.html?path=../video/prom
os/0803 (last visited July 31, 2006).  This understanding of Bizarro comes from his more 
recent appearances in the Superman comics, in which his manner of speaking is no longer 
marked only by the third person accusative, but also by saying the opposite of what he 
means.  Furthermore, in these more recent appearances, Bizarro’s behavior is intended to 
be evil, rather than confused or misguided.  See, e.g., Superman Homepage, Who’s Who in 
the Superman Comics:  Bizarro, http://www.supermanhomepage.com/comics/who/who-
intro.php?topic=bizarro (last visited Aug. 29, 2006). 
18 See Don Markstein’s Toonpedia, Bizarro, http://www.toonopedia.com/bizarro1.htm 
(Last visited Aug. 29, 2006) (“Comics writer Alvin Schwartz, who scripted the Superman 
newspaper strip in the 1950s, said many years later that he saw the Superman character, at 
that time, as a creature of radiant light, and conceived Bizarro as sort of a dark Superman 
— not evil, as opposed to Superman's goodness, but a Superman without radiance.”) 
19 See Superman Super Site, supra note 14. 
20 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233-34 (2005) (“[W]hen Congress uses the 
same language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted 
shortly after the other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have 
the same meaning in both statutes.  We have consistently applied that presumption to 
language in the ADEA that was ‘derived in haec verba’ from Title VII.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
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mutation of the statutory stare decisis logic takes root in Smith. It is the 
duplicating ray, if you will.   
Congress enacted the 1991 Act in part to repudiate several Supreme 
Court decisions from the Court’s October 1989 term, including Wards 
Cove, which narrowly interpreted the disparate impact theory of recovery 
under Title VII. The 1991 Act explicitly overrode Wards Cove’s 
interpretation of Title VII.  It rejected Wards Cove specifically and quickly.  
But, because Wards Cove interpreted language that was identical to (some 
of)21 the ADEA’s language at issue in Smith, the Court treated Wards Cove 
as controlling precedent for the ADEA, despite its clear repudiation in the 
Title VII context.  The doctrine of statutory stare decisis arguably supports 
the Court’s interpretive move.  Yet, it is more than a bit odd for the 
Supreme Court to treat Congress’s silence with regard to the ADEA in the 
1991 Act as Congress’s explicit approval of an interpretation it had 
overridden nearly a decade and a half earlier.  The combination of the 
presumption of consistent interpretation of Title VII and the ADEA and the 
acquiescence justification for the strong presumption of statutory stare 
decisis,22 resulted in an unreasoned and unsound (i.e., Bizarro) 
interpretation of the ADEA.   
Notably, the Smith Court’s creation of Bizarro statutory stare decisis is 
not destined to be a unique occurrence.  Just as Bizarro was allowed to 
roam, wreaking havoc along his way, Bizarro statutory stare decisis could 
be used in other contexts, including those involving the application of other 
overridden interpretations of Title VII to the ADEA.  If allowed to flourish, 
this Bizarro version of statutory stare decisis would place the onus on 
Congress to amend every statute to which the Supreme Court could 
theoretically extend an erroneous or misguided interpretation, when 
Congress sets about to correct the Court’s mistakes. 
This paper describes why Bizarro statutory stare decisis is a flawed 
interpretive approach.  The Smith Court’s reliance on it to revive Wards 
Cove was misguided and failed to serve the purposes generally thought to 
be served by the doctrine of statutory stare decisis.23 As an alternative, this 
paper advocates that the Court approach situations like that in Smith as 
requiring interpretation of the statutory language in the first instance, with 
due care not to revive congressionally overridden interpretations without 
substantial justification. 
In Part I, the paper provides the background for the Smith decision’s 
 
21 The ADEA’s “reasonable factor other than age” defense in section 4(f)(1) is an 
exception.  See 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(1) (2000).  Title VII has no similar defense.  See Parts III 
and V, infra, for discussions of the significance of that textual difference. 
22 See infra Part II.B.1 for a fuller description of the acquiescence justification. 
23 See infra Part III.B.  
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creation of Bizarro statutory stare decisis.24 In particular, it discusses the 
several landmark cases in which the Supreme Court recognized, endorsed, 
and fashioned the disparate impact theory under Title VII, culminating in 
Wards Cove. Then, it discusses the congressional repudiation of Wards 
Cove in the 1991 Act.  Finally, Part I discusses the history of the application 
of the disparate impact theory under the ADEA leading up to the Smith 
decision, which unfolds in two chapters:  (1) consistently and without 
controversy, relatively speaking, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins25 and (2) chaotically and inconsistently 
following that decision. 
Parts II and III tell the story of the origin of Bizarro statutory stare 
decisis and what makes it “Bizarro.”  In particular, Part II describes the two 
essential elements to the creation of Bizarro statutory stare decisis:  the 
consistency presumption26 and statutory stare decisis.27 This part also 
briefly describes the various justifications for the doctrine of statutory stare 
decisis.  Part III.A then discusses the Court’s opinion in Smith, with primary 
focus on the resurrection of Wards Cove’s interpretation of the structure of 
and evidentiary burdens in a disparate impact case.  Part III.B explains why 
Smith’s Bizarro statutory stare decisis fails to fulfill the various 
justifications in support of a strong presumption of statutory stare decisis 
described in Part II.B. 
Part IV highlights the problems that likely will result if Bizarro statutory 
stare decisis is allowed to take root.  The confusion regarding the mixed-
motives theory of discrimination and the overridden interpretation of Title 
VII in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins28 provides a concrete example of a 
context in which Bizarro statutory stare decisis could again play a decisive 
and destructive role in the interpretation of the ADEA.29 
Finally, Part V provides an alternative approach to interpreting statutes 
like the ADEA in Smith, without resort to Bizarro statutory stare decisis.  I 
argue that the Court should undertake an interpretation of such language as 
 
24 Part I, thus, parallels the Superman mythos, which is essential to a full 
understanding of the Bizarro story. 
25 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
26 The consistency presumption parallels the duplicating ray in the Bizarro story.  
While the comic book context allows one to suspend disbelief and accept the existence of 
the duplicating ray despite its questionable science, the consistency presumption requires a 
bit of explication.  Part II.A provides the metaphorical “specs” for the consistency 
presumption duplicating ray. 
27 In the allegory to the Bizarro story, statutory stare decisis represents Superman.  It is 
the original “super” power, see infra note 111 and accompanying text, from which the 
imperfect, Bizarro power is derived. 
28 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
29 This part parallels the destruction Bizarro caused when he was allowed to roam the 
city on his own. 
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it would in the first instance.  Though the Court need not necessarily adopt 
the amended statute’s approach, it should be cautious not to adopt the 
overridden interpretation without specific textual, purposive, or historical 
indicators that the overridden interpretation is even more compellingly 
appropriate in the subsequent statutory context (in this case, the ADEA) 
than it was in the original statute (in this case, Title VII).  Part V concludes 
with an explanation of how my recommended approach would have played 
out in the Smith case. 
 
I. THE HISTORY OF DISPARATE IMPACT: THE BIZARRO BACKSTORY 
The story of the evolution of the disparate impact theory is important to 
set the stage for why the Supreme Court’s creation of Bizarro statutory stare 
decisis in Smith was unwarranted and doctrinally dangerous.  This section 
will discuss the genesis and development of the disparate impact theory 
under Title VII in the Supreme Court through the Wards Cove decision.  
Then, it will describe the congressional reaction to Wards Cove in the 1991 
Act.  In the second part of this section, the federal courts’ application of 
disparate impact under the ADEA prior to the Smith decision will be 
described. 
 
A.  Disparate Impact Theory Under Title VII 
 
Few would argue that Congress had anticipated the specifics of 
disparate impact theory when it enacted Title VII.  However, disparate 
impact garnered the attention of the federal courts shortly after Title VII’s 
enactment and attracted controversy. 
 
1. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.30 and its early progeny:  Recognizing and 
refining disparate impact 
 
Although disparate treatment claims are more common, and perhaps 
because disparate treatment is “the most easily understood type of 
discrimination,”31 one of the Supreme Court’s first forays32 into interpreting 
 
30 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
31 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 421 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).  The ease 
by which disparate treatment may be understood is belied by the continuing attention 
commentators and courts devote to the difficult questions raised by disparate treatment 
theory.  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact:  Looking Past the Desert Palace 
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911,  916-925 (2005) (describing the “motive-intent 
question” and trait discrimination as seriously complicated issues that disparate treatment 
theory raises).  
32Technically, Griggs was the second Title VII case to reach the Supreme Court. 
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Title VII dealt with a disparate impact claim.  In Griggs, a group of 
African-American employees challenged their employer’s practice of 
requiring a high school diploma and passing scores on standardized tests as 
conditions for hire or transfer to various departments.33 While the employer 
had a history of overt discrimination against black applicants in its hiring 
practices and segregation in its assignments to departments, it abandoned 
those policies and practices prior to Title VII’s effective date in 1965.34 
Nevertheless, the graduation and standardized test requirements tended to 
perpetuate the status quo.  Black employees were still largely segregated in 
the lowest paid department.35 Notably, neither the high school graduation 
requirement nor the standardized test requirement was shown to – or 
intended to – isolate workers with particular ability to learn or to perform 
the jobs for which they were used as screening devices.36 Instead, the 
purpose of the requirements was to maintain “the overall quality of the 
workforce.”37 Yet, workers who had not graduated from high school and 
who had not passed the standardized tests were able to perform the jobs 
satisfactorily.38 
Because the diploma and standardized testing requirements screened out 
a “markedly disproportionate” number of black employees,39 the Court 
addressed whether the requirements could violate Title VII.  The Court 
interpreted section 703(a)(2) of Title VII40 as authorizing such disparate 
 
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971), preceded Griggs by approximately 
three months.  The two cases were argued before the Court within a week of each other.  
Phillips, which involved a claim by a woman who was denied an employment opportunity 
because she had preschool-aged children even though fathers of preschool-aged children 
were not similarly denied the opportunity, was a short per curium opinion.  Id. at 543.  The 
Supreme Court’s opinion vacating and remanding the case, stated “[t]he Court of Appeals 
therefore erred in reading . . . section [703(a)] as permitting one hiring policy for women 
and another for men -- each having pre-school-age children.” Id. at 544.  Phillips is 
considered the foundation for the theory of “sex-plus” or “gender-plus” discrimination.  
See Devon W. Carbado and Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black Woman, 11 J. OF CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 701, 722 (2001) (“Phillips established what is now referred to as the sex-
plus doctrine.”). 
33 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 427-28. 
34 Id. at 427. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 431. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 431-32. 
39 Id. at 429. 
40 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).  
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
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impact claims, even in the absence of an employer’s intent to discriminate. 
The Court focused on the consequences of employment practices instead of 
the motivation for them,41 accepting the lower court’s finding that the 
employer had not intentionally discriminated against the black employees 
by implementing the requirements.  Nevertheless, the Court determined that 
intent was not required when a non-job-related policy or practice had 
discriminatory effects.42 The meat of the Court’s reasoning is in the 
following passage:   
[Title VII] proscribes not only overt discrimination but also 
practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.  The 
touchstone is business necessity.  If an employment practice which 
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job 
performance, the practice is prohibited.43 
Thus, the concept of “business necessity” became central to evaluating 
whether a neutral policy with discriminatory results is prohibited under 
Title VII.44 
Over the next fifteen years a body of case law developed adding nuance 
to the general outline of the disparate impact claim announced in Griggs.45 
In general, however, the basic structure and the allocation of burdens of a 
disparate impact claim remained consistent.46 The plaintiff had to prove a 
prima facie case by producing statistical evidence of a disparate impact, 
which was caused by some neutral employment practice.  Then, the burden 
 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.   
Id. 
41 Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. 
42 Id. (“We do not suggest that either the District Court or the Court of Appeals erred 
in examining the employer’s intent; but good intent or absence of discriminatory intent 
does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in 
headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”) 
43 Id. at 431. 
44 Id. 
45 Disparate impact claims heard by the Supreme Court in this period included 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (finding actionable disparate impact claim if 
some policy, practice, or procedure results in adverse impact, even if ultimate “bottom line” 
employment numbers evidence no imbalance); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) 
(extending disparate impact claims to height and weight restrictions that had an adverse 
impact on the basis of gender and requiring close correlation between the standard and job 
performance); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that the Constitution’s 
Equal Protection Clause does not include a Title VII-type disparate impact claim, but 
instead requires proof of discriminatory intent); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 
405 (1975) (requiring validation of tests to show job relatedness).  
46 But see Earl M. Maltz, The Legacy of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.: A Case Study in 
the Impact of a Modernist Statutory Precedent, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1353, 1370-71 (arguing 
that the business necessity and job related requirements were inconsistently applied in the 
courts during this time). 
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shifted to the employer to justify the necessity of the challenged practice.  
In the late 1980s, however, that all changed. 
 
2. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust47: Foreshadowing Wards Cove’s 
retrenchment 
 
After the relatively straightforward process of maturation during the 
first decade and a half after Griggs, disparate impact theory experienced 
major growing pains on the eve of its metaphorical passage into adulthood.  
Just shy of Griggs’s eighteenth birthday, the Supreme Court issued a 
fractured opinion in Watson,48 which recognized that subjective or 
discretionary employee selection practices or procedures could be the basis 
for disparate impact claims.49 Notably, however, in the plurality portion of 
her opinion, Justice O’Connor offered a re-imagining of the allocation of 
the burdens on the parties to a disparate impact case.  As such, Watson 
foreshadowed the retrenchment found in Wards Cove and set the stage for 
the 1991 Act’s disparate impact amendment.   
Clara Watson, an African-American woman, worked as a bank teller for 
Fort Worth Bank & Trust.50 Over the course of a couple of years Watson 
applied for at least four separate open positions at Fort Worth, all of which 
would have been promotions.51 She was not chosen to fill any of the 
vacancies.  In each case the person who was hired was white.52 Fort Worth 
had no formal, objective criteria or procedures for evaluating applicants for 
the types of positions to which Watson applied.  Rather, Fort Worth relied 
on the subjective judgment of supervisors who were familiar with the 
 
47 487 U.S. 977 (1988). 
48 Justice O’Connor penned an opinion that was part-majority and part-plurality.  The 
eight members of the Court who participated in the consideration and decision of the case 
agreed as to the judgment and agreed that disparate impact claims pursuant to Title VII 
could be based on subjective or discretionary employee selection practices, but four of the 
justices refused to join what Justice Stevens called the plurality’s “‘fresh’ interpretation of 
[the Court’s] prior cases applying disparate impact analysis to objective employment 
criteria.” Id. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
49 Prior to Watson the Supreme Court had only endorsed and applied the disparate 
impact model to objective criteria, such as educational requirements, standardized tests, 
and height and weight requirements.  See, e.g., Teal, 457 U.S. at 443 (written test); New 
York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 570 (1979) (prohibition against 
methadone users); Dothard, 433 U.S. at 323-24 (height and weight requirements);  Davis,
426 U.S. at 234-35 (test of verbal skills); Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 410-11 (written aptitude 
test); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26 (high school diploma and standardized testing 
requirements). 
50 Watson, 487 U.S. at 982. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
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applicants and with the positions in question.53 
Watson filed suit against Fort Worth alleging race discrimination on 
behalf of a class of “blacks who applied to or were employed by [Fort 
Worth] on or after October 21, 1979 or who may submit employment 
applications to [Fort Worth] in the future.”54 The lower court held that 
Watson’s case was inappropriate for disparate impact, due to the subjective 
nature of the hiring and promotion process.55 Justice O’Connor envisioned 
the Court’s task in Watson as follows:  “In order to resolve this [split in the 
circuits], we must determine whether the reasons that support the use of 
disparate impact analysis apply to subjective employment practices and 
whether such analysis can be applied in this new context under workable 
evidentiary standards.”56 She identified two fundamental questions for the 
Court to answer:  (1) does disparate impact analysis apply to subjective 
practices at all?; and, (2) if it does, how must the burdens be allocated 
between the parties and what evidence must each produce? 
With regard to the first question, all of the participating justices agreed 
that disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjective selection 
practices.57 The justices recognized that Griggs and its progeny could too 
easily be subverted and effectively nullified if a strict subjective/objective 
line were drawn, applying disparate impact only to the latter.58 Moreover, 
 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 983. 
55 Though the lower courts’ energies were largely focused on whether the class could 
be properly certified and, if so, whether Watson was an appropriate class representative, id. 
at 983-84, the ultimately important issue was whether disparate impact analysis properly 
could be applied to Watson’s claim since the promotion process was one of nearly 
unfettered discretion given to the relevant supervisors.  The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit held that “‘a Title VII challenge to an allegedly discretionary 
promotion system is properly analyzed under the disparate treatment model rather than the 
disparate impact model.’” Id. at 984 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 798 
F.2d 791, 797 (1986)).  The Fifth Circuit’s holding created a split among the circuit courts 
regarding the application of disparate impact analysis to discretionary or subjective hiring 
or promotion procedures. Id. (citing contrary holdings in Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing 
Co., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1522-25 
(11th Cir. 1985)).  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve that question. Id. at 985. 
56 Id. at 989. 
57 Id. at 989-990.  See also id. at 1000 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
58 Id. at 989.  For instance, Justice O’Connor noted that, regardless of where the line 
between subjective and objective procedures were drawn, procedures involving a mix of 
the two would by necessity fall on the subjective side of the line.  Therefore, if disparate 
impact analysis were only applied to objective criteria, an employer could insulate its 
reliance on written tests, diploma requirements, or height and weight restrictions by making 
them formally non-determinative (though practically determinative) and adding a 
subjective interview step to the process. Id. at 989-90.  But see generally Michael Selmi, 
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (arguing that the 
expansion of disparate impact theory to practices other than objective criteria, primarily 
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the justices saw nothing inherently different in a disparate impact from an 
objective criterion and one resulting from a subjective process.  In both 
cases, a facially neutral practice, which was not intentionally 
discriminatory, could nevertheless produce discriminatory results.59 
The unanimity of the justices broke down, though, as Justice O’Connor 
proceeded to the next step in her analysis, namely, the allocation of the 
evidentiary burdens in a disparate impact claim.  The plurality for which 
Justice O’Connor was writing found meaningful differences between 
objective and subjective practices when considering that Griggs was 
traditionally understood to require the employer to justify a challenged 
practice by proving business necessity and job relatedness.60 While 
objective tests can be justified through formal validation studies, the 
plurality was concerned that employers would not be able to likewise 
“validate” subjective criteria or processes.61 The plurality was concerned 
that the application of disparate impact to subjective criteria would lead 
employers to adopt quotas in order to avoid shortfalls which would in turn 
require the employers to prove that their subjective processes were 
necessary, but without the benefit of validation studies.62 
To alleviate the burden on employers to justify their subjective practices 
and to avoid the perceived Hobson’s choice of disparate impact liability or 
quotas, the plurality revisited and refined the evidentiary standards of a 
disparate impact case.  In particular, the plurality stated that bare statistical 
disparities in the workforce would be insufficient to support a prima facie 
case of disparate impact.63 Rather, the plurality claimed that the plaintiff 
had the burden to identify the particular employment practice that caused 
the adverse impact,64 which is often much easier when only objective 
 
testing and seniority cases, was a mistake in that it frustrated the development of an 
expansive concept of intent under disparate treatment theory). 
59 Id. at 990. 
60 Once a statistically and legally significant disparate impact was shown, Griggs and 
its progeny shifted the burden to the employer to justify the challenged practice.  See id. at 
991 (citing Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 426; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).  See also supra Part 
I.A.1. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 992.  But see Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretation:  A Legal Autopsy,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1095, 1130-33 (1993) (describing this concern about quota 
avoidance as a “vampire argument,” in which an objection to legislation that was rejected 
when Congress enacted it is revived as courts insist the objection must be accounted for in 
the interpretation of the legislation). 
63 Id. at 994. 
64 The plurality noted that the statistical evidence of adverse impact must be reliable, 
significant, and appropriately suited to show a causal connection between the challenged 
practice and the ultimate exclusion of members of a protected group.  Id. at 994-95.  The 
plurality declined, however, to set any particular threshold shortfall requirement, instead 
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criteria are involved than when subjective criteria are used alone or in 
combination with objective criteria.65 In other words, the plurality would 
not allow a multi-factored or multi-step process to be subject to a disparate 
impact claim, even if the statistical evidence of exclusion of members of a 
protected class were stark, unless the plaintiff could isolate the particular 
criterion, practice, or procedure that caused the impact. 
Second, the plurality argued that the plaintiff should at all times retain 
the ultimate burden of proof of discrimination.  Despite language in prior 
cases suggesting otherwise,66 the plurality stated that, when the employer 
has produced “evidence that its employment practices are based on 
legitimate business reasons,”67 the plaintiff should have the burden to prove 
that other selection devices or practices could meet the employer’s 
legitimate interest without the undesired adverse impact.68 
The concurring justices took issue with the plurality’s construction of 
the burdens.69 Justice Blackmun’s concurrence, joined by Justices Brennan 
and Marshall, criticized the plurality’s allocation and description of the 
evidentiary burdens.  It argued that the plurality’s construction departed 
from precedent and undermined Congress’s desire to prohibit practices that 
result in discriminatory effects as well as to prohibit intentionally 
discriminatory decisions.70 In particular, Justice Blackmun argued that a 
plaintiff should be required only to show the prohibited discriminatory 
effects by appropriately significant statistics.  After that, the employer 
should bear the burden of justifying the practice that caused the disparate 
impact, whether objective or subjective.71 
claiming that a case-by-case approach was preferable.  Id. at 995 n.3. 
65 Id. at 994. 
66 See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329 (requiring employer to “prov[e] that its tests are 
‘job related’”); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (“Congress has placed on the employer the burden 
of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.”). 
67 As Justice Blackmun explained in his concurrence, this formulation seems to reflect 
the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formulation of the shifting burdens in a disparate 
treatment case rather than a disparate impact claim and indicates that the employer has only 
the burden of producing evidence indicative of job relatedness rather than a burden of 
proving that the challenged practice is necessary.  Watson, 487 U.S. at 1001-02 (Blackmun, 
J., concurring). 
68 Id. at 998. 
69 Justice Stevens objected to the discussion wholesale, arguing it was unnecessary to 
address the evidentiary standards, as the Court had answered the question presented 
regarding the applicability of disparate impact to subjective criteria in the affirmative.  Id. 
at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring).  He saw no benefit to discussing evidentiary burdens in 
the abstract. 
70 Id. at 1002. 
71 Id. The disagreement between the plurality and the concurring justices also revolved 
around the type of evidence – and ease with which that evidence could be shown – that 
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Because there was no majority opinion regarding the question of 
evidentiary burdens, the stage was set for a clarification.  The plurality’s re-
allocation of the burden of proof to the plaintiff and the requirement to 
identify specific practices with significant statistical evidence of causation 
set the stage for the majority’s retrenchment in Wards Cove.
3. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio72: Limiting disparate impact 
The wait for clarification was short.  The Court heard Wards Cove the 
next term. A class of workers at a salmon cannery in Alaska claimed that 
their employers (“the canneries”) discriminated against them on the basis of 
their race, raising both disparate treatment and disparate impact claims.73 
The workers claimed that the hiring and promotion practices74 of the 
canneries resulted in a racially segregated workforce and limited the 
opportunities of the class based on their race.75 In the lower courts the 
disparate treatment claims were rejected, but the disparate impact claims 
raised several issues that Watson left unresolved.76 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to determine definitively the proper evidentiary standards 
of a disparate impact analysis.77 
This time a bare majority ostensibly adopted the approach of Justice 
 
could justify a challenged subjective practice.  The plurality argued that validation of 
subjective criteria was nearly impossible and suggested that showing a connection between 
the criteria and the employment would be relatively easy.  Id. at 998-99.  The concurrence 
argued that validation was not impossible and that evidence other than formal “validation 
studies,” such as expert testimony and historically documented success, could be presented 
to support subjective criteria.  Id. at 1006-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Furthermore, the 
concurring justices argued that justifying subjective or discretionary criteria would often be 
more challenging rather than easier as the plurality had suggested. Id. at 1008-09. 
72 490 U.S. 642 (1989). 
73 Id. at 648. 
74 Specifically, the employees challenged the canneries’ following hiring and 
promotion practices:  “nepotism, a rehire preference, a lack of objective hiring criteria, 
separate hiring channels, [and] a practice of not promoting from within.”  Id at 647. 
75 The canneries were located in remote areas of Alaska.  Id. at 646.  The workforce 
was divided into unskilled “cannery jobs” and primarily skilled “noncannery jobs,” which 
were uniformly higher paying than the cannery jobs.  Id. at 647  Local and Filipino (non-
white) workers dominated the cannery jobs, while the noncannery skilled positions were 
primarily filled by white Washingtonians and Oregonians who were hired in the offseason 
at the canneries’ mainland offices.  Id. 
76 Though beyond the scope of this paper, the Court also clarified what sort of 
statistical comparison would be sufficient to make out a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.  Id. at 650 (noting that the plaintiff’s evidence of a significant imbalance in the 
racial make-up of the two classes of workers was insufficient to support a prima facie case 
without reference to the expected balance based on the qualified relevant labor force). 
77 Id. 
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O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Watson.  First, the Court required a 
disparate impact plaintiff to identify the specific challenged employment 
practice and to show that it caused a disparate impact on the basis of a 
protected category.78 By creating this specific causation requirement, the 
Court sought to spare employers from “being potentially liable for ‘the 
myriad of innocent causes that may lead to statistical imbalances in the 
composition of their work forces.’”79 
Second, the Court adopted Justice O’Connor’s allocations of the 
burdens of production and persuasion after the plaintiff has established its 
prima facie case.  In particular, the Court held that the burden of persuasion 
remains with the plaintiff at all times.80 The Court required the employer to 
respond to the prima facie case by producing evidence of its business 
justification for the challenged practice; however, the employer was not 
required to show that the practice was “essential” or “indispensable.”81 
That construction is notable for two reasons:  (1) as the Court admitted, 
prior precedent suggested that the burden of proof (both production and 
persuasion) shifted to the employer upon the employee’s prima facie 
showing of disparate impact82 and (2) even with the lower burden of 
production, the court changed the description of that burden from “business 
necessity”83 to “business justification.”84 
Finally, if the employer produced evidence of a business justification, 
the employee could still prevail by showing that equally effective 
alternative practices served the employer’s legitimate employment goals 
 
78 Id. at 657 (“As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application 
of a specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact under 
attack.”). 
79 Id. (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 992). 
80 Id. at 659. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 660 (“We acknowledge that some of our earlier decisions can be read as 
suggesting otherwise.  But to the extent that those cases speak of an employer’s ‘burden of 
proof’ with respect to a legitimate business justification defense, they should have been 
understood to mean an employer’s production – but not persuasion – burden.” (internal 
citations omitted)). 
83 See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 (“The touchstone is business necessity.” (emphasis 
added)). 
84 Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.  Interestingly, the Court used Griggs’s “touchstone” 
phrase, but substituted justification for necessity. Then, it specifically held that the 
justification must be more than insubstantial, but need not be “essential” or 
“indispensable.”  Id. The Court’s verbal formula for business justification was that the 
“challenged practice [must] serve[], in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals 
of the employer.”  Id. That was a far less exacting standard than the business necessity 
formulation previously endorsed by the Court and applied by the lower courts.  Though, in 
fairness, there was substantial variation in applying the standard among the lower courts 
prior to Wards Cove. See infra note 91. 
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while reducing the impact on the protected class.85 But, not just any 
alternative would do.  The employee’s alternative must have been known to 
and rejected by the employer.86 Furthermore, the Court determined that 
issues such as efficiency, cost, and other burdens were relevant to 
determining whether the alternative practice was in fact equally effective.87 
4. 1991 Act:  Overriding Wards Cove 
Congress quickly responded to Wards Cove’s restrictive interpretation 
of the disparate impact claim.  As part of the 1991 Act, Congress amended 
Title VII, adding section 703(k).88 The amendment was a purposeful 
repudiation of Wards Cove’s construction of the disparate impact claim.89 
85 Wards Cove, 490 U.S.. at 660-61. 
86 Thus, the employer’s rejection “belie[s] a claim . . . that [the] incumbent practices 
are being employed for nondiscriminatory reasons.” Id. at 661. 
87 Id. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).  In relevant part, section 703(k) reads: 
(k) (1) (A) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is 
established under this title only if- 
 (i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular 
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the 
challenged practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with 
business necessity; or 
 (ii) the complaining party makes the demonstration described in 
subparagraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and the 
respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.  
 (B) (i) With respect to demonstrating that a particular employment practice 
causes a disparate impact as described in subparagraph (A)(i), the complaining 
party shall demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice 
causes a disparate impact, except that if the complaining party can demonstrate to 
the court that the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not 
capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as 
one employment practice.  
 (ii) If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice 
does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to 
demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity.  
 (C) The demonstration referred to by subparagraph (A)(ii) shall be in 
accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989, with respect to the concept 
of “alternative employment practice.”  
 (2) A demonstration that an employment practice is required by business 
necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional 
discrimination under this title.  
Id. 
89 See Section 105 of the 1991 Act, which includes the amendment quoted supra at 
note 88, makes an interpretive memorandum the exclusive legislative history for that 
amendment.  The memorandum proclaims that the terms "business necessity" and "job 
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Specifically, the amendment allows the plaintiff to establish a disparate 
impact based on the employer’s decisionmaking process as a whole, if the 
process cannot be separated to isolate the specific, individual parts to be 
challenged.90 Also, the amendment adopts the “job related” and “business 
necessity” standards over the “business justification” and “legitimate 
interests” standards in Wards Cove.91 Finally, the 1991 Act clearly placed 
the burden of proving business necessity on the employer,92 overriding 
Wards Cove’s allocation of the mere burden of production on the employer 
at that stage.93 
Of particular note here, the 1991 Act did not amend or even refer to the 
ADEA with regard to disparate impact claims. 
 
B.  Disparate Impact Theory Under ADEA (Pre-Smith)
The history of disparate impact analysis under the ADEA prior to the 
Supreme Court’s Smith opinion unfolds in two stages.  Prior to 1993, the 
lower courts generally assumed that disparate impact analysis could be 
employed under the ADEA, just as Title VII.94 In 1993, however, the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hazen Paper v. Biggins95 challenged that 
assumption.  The ensuing dozen years saw relative chaos in the lower courts 
regarding the application of disparate impact under the ADEA and the 
circuit courts splintered,96 until Smith resolved the issue. 
 
related" in the 1991 Act "reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to 
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)." 137 Cong. Rec. S15276 (daily 
ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (Statement of Sen. Danforth). 
90 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). 
91 Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).  Some commentators have suggested, though, that the 
adoption of the standard of job relatedness and business necessity only incorporated pre-
Wards Cove doctrinal confusion.  See, e.g., Maltz, supra note 46, at 1370-71 (“Ultimately, 
Congress chose not to resolve the apparent conflicts in the case law.  Legislators instead 
adopted compromise language . . .   At the same time, the legislative history on this issue 
explicitly states that the Civil Rights Act simply reinstates the law as it existed prior to 
1989.”); Linda Lye, Comment:  Title VII’s Tangled Tale:  The Erosion and Confusion of 
Disparate Impact and the Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
315, 335 (1998) (“In essence, the 1991 Act codified the confusion which formerly 
prevailed.”). 
92 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) and (k)(1)(B)(ii). 
93 See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. 
94 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236-37 (2005) (“Indeed, for over two 
decades after our decision in Griggs, the Courts of Appeal uniformly interpreted the ADEA 
as authorizing recovery on a ‘disparate-impact’ theory in appropriate cases.”). 
95 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
96 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 237 n. 9 (collecting authorities).  See also Dennison Keller, 
Note:  Older, Wiser and More Dispensable:  ADEA Options Available Under Smith v. 
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1. Before Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: General recognition 
 
Lower courts uniformly assumed that Griggs and its progeny applied 
with equal force to the ADEA, because Title VII and the ADEA shared the 
same relevant text.97 In fact, a number of courts even followed lead of the 
1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII, adopting the business necessity 
defense in the ADEA context.  The EEOC’s interpretive guidelines 
endorsed the application of disparate impact under the ADEA and 
incorporated the business necessity defense as well.98 The Supreme Court’s 
1993 opinion in Hazen Paper upset that uniformity. 
 
In Hazen Paper, Biggins claimed that his employer violated the ADEA 
when it terminated him in an attempt to keep his pension fund from 
vesting.99 Biggins was 62 years old and would have been an expensive 
pensioner.  Though the Supreme Court recognized that the decision to 
terminate Biggins prior to his vesting date was correlated with his age, it 
was motivated by his years of service and the high cost of his pension rather 
than his age.100 As a result, the Court held that Biggins’s disparate 
treatment claim failed, because the employment decision was based on a 
factor other than age.101 
In dicta, the Court specifically mentioned that its decision should not be 
interpreted as deciding whether disparate impact claims based on criteria 
correlated with age could be successful under the ADEA.102 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence, however, explicitly stated that the ADEA might 
not allow such disparate impact claims.103 
2. After Hazen Paper: Circuits Split 
 
Though the Supreme Court had not definitively decided the issue, a 
number of lower courts interpreted Hazen Paper as a repudiation of the 
disparate impact theory as applied under the ADEA.  A split in the circuit 
 
Jackson: Desperate Times Call for Disparate Impact, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 259, 268 (2006) 
(collecting cases illustrative of the split). 
97 See supra note 40 and infra note 109 and accompanying text.  This was ultimately 
the position taken by the Court in Smith.  See Smith, 544 U.S. at 234. 
98 See id. at 239. 
99 Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 606-07. 
100 Id. at 610. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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courts developed.  The circuit courts finding that the ADEA allowed 
disparate impact claims included the Second, Eighth, and Ninth.  Courts 
disallowing such claims were the First, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and 
Eleventh.104 
In 2002, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the split, but 
subsequently dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.105 
Over two years later, the Court again granted certiorari to resolve the split, 
heard the argument in Smith, and finally laid to rest the confusion Hazen 
Paper had wrought. 
 
II. THE INTERPLAY OF TWO PRESUMPTIONS: THE DUPLICATING RAY  
AND THE ORIGINAL “SUPER” POWER 
This part will provide a more thorough explanation of the practice of 
and the theory behind the two presumptions that were at play in Smith.  
First, it discuses the presumption that statutory text that is lifted from one 
statute into another should result in consistent interpretations of the statutes’ 
shared language.  Then, it turns to the presumption of enhanced statutory 
stare decisis.  
 
A.  The Consistency Presumption:  Duplicating Prior Interpretations 
 
When the legislature borrows language from one statute to draft a 
subsequent statute, courts generally agree that the statutes should be 
construed consistently with one another.  Thus, an interpretation of one 
statute is usually treated as binding on the other, when it involves the same 
language.  This is a specific application of the in pari materia canon of 
statutory construction.106 For purposes of this paper, I call it the 
“consistency presumption.” 
Courts have applied the consistency presumption when interpreting the 
 
104 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 237 n.9.
105 Adams v. Florida Power Corp., 535 U.S. 228 (2002). 
106 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990) (“[S]tatutes which relate to the 
same subject matter should be read, construed and applied together so that the legislature’s 
intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.”). See also Caren Spencer, 
Comment:  When a Boss Isn't an Employer: Limitations of Title VII Coverage, 25 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 441, 466 (2004) (“Analysis of Title VII, the ADA, and 
ADEA is very closely integrated, as Title VII and ADEA use the same definitions in most 
instances and many of those terms are explicitly incorporated into the ADA. As the statutes 
have similar goals and structures, using the canon of in pari materia, they should be 
interpreted similarly, unless the legislative history or purpose suggests material 
differences.”). 
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language of the ADEA that was lifted directly from Title VII.107 This 
presumption was a central theme in the Smith case, not only because it was 
the “duplicating ray” by which the Court’s deference to Wards Cove out of
respect for statutory stare decisis was Bizarro, but also because the Court 
treated Griggs as “precedent of compelling importance.”108 The statutory 
language at issue in Griggs was nearly identical to that at issue in Smith.109 
B.  Statutory Stare Decisis:  The “Super-Strong Presumption” 
 
The Supreme Court traditionally has been exceedingly deferential to its 
precedents that involve interpretation of ambiguous statutory language.110 
William Eskridge dubbed the Court’s practice of enhanced statutory stare 
decisis a “super-strong presumption.”111 According to the doctrine of 
statutory stare decisis, once the Court has interpreted statutory language, it 
will avoid revisiting the issue.112 The underlying theory is that, unlike the 
 
107 See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 233-34 (“We have consistently applied that 
presumption to language in the ADEA that was derived in haec verba from Title VII.” 
(internal quotes omitted)); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416 (1985) 
(using interpretations of Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification defense as 
authoritative interpretations of the ADEA’s identically-worded defense); Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 83 L. Ed. 2d 523, 105 S. Ct. 613 (1985) 
(“This interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies with equal force in 
the context of age discrimination, for the substantive provisions of the ADEA were derived 
in haec verba from Title VII.” (internal citation and quotes omitted)). 
108 Smith, 544 U.S. at 234. 
109 In both cases, the language was:   
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to limit, 
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way 
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s 
age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000), or race, color, sex, religion or national origin, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000), 
110 See Barrett, supra note 9, at 319 (describing the doctrine of statutory stare decisis). 
111 Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 2, at 1363. 
112 The Court’s most famous and enduring example of adhering to a statutory 
interpretation of increasingly lessening viability involved Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. 
v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), which granted organized 
baseball an exception to the Sherman Act’s prohibition of contracts in restraint of trade.  In 
two subsequent cases, the Court continued to stand by the Federal Baseball exemption, 
despite the fact that the Court had refused to provide similar exemptions for the other 
similar professional sports leagues.  See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 
(1953); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).  The basis for this super-strong presumption 
of validity for Federal Baseball was that it was a statutory interpretation decision and 
Congress could have, but did not, override it.  See Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357; Flood, 407 
U.S. at 258.  For a concise but complete discussion of the baseball cases, see Barrett, supra 
note 9, at 319-20. 
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constitutional interpretation context where legislative action is a virtual 
impossibility,113 Congress has the ability to – and with relative frequency, in 
fact, does114 – step in to correct and to override the Court’s statutory 
interpretation decisions with which it disagrees.115 As a result, a party who 
requests that the Court overrule a statutory precedent faces a more onerous 
burden than does a party who requests that the Court revisit other types of 
cases.116 If a change in the interpretation is what the party seeks, Congress 
is the appropriate body to make such policy choices, if possible. 
Rules of stare decisis, including that for enhanced statutory stare decisis 
are not mandatory, though.  Stare decisis is a prudential doctrine.117 Thus it 
can be, and with relative frequency is, ignored and statutory interpretation 
decisions are overruled by the Court.118 If there is some “special 
justification,” the Court may retreat from an earlier statutory precedent.119 
Amanda L. Tyler, who advocates for a strong (but not absolute) rule of 
statutory stare decisis, would find such special justification when statutory 
precedents are “wholly out of sync with the legal fabric.”120 
113 Eskridge argues that the strength of the Supreme Court’s adherence to stare decisis 
differs with the kind of case it is deciding.  Statutory interpretation precedents receive the 
super-strong presumption.  Constitutional precedents are afforded relatively weak 
precedential value.  Federal common law precedents are more respected than constitutional 
decisions, but are more likely to be overruled than statutory precedents.  See Eskridge, 
Overruling, supra note 2, at 1362. 
114 For an extensive empirical study of the frequency with which Congress overrides 
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, see generally Eskridge, Overriding,
supra note 2.  Eskridge studied the years 1967-1990.  Id. at 335.  In particular, he 
determined that each Congress between 1975 and 1990 overrode an average of about a 
dozen of the Court’s statutory interpretation decisions.  Id. at 335-36. 
115 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987) (“When 
a court says to a legislature: ‘You (or your predecessor) meant X,’ it almost invites the 
legislature to answer:  ‘We did not.’”).  See also Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation, 
Legislative Inaction, and Civil Rights, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2, 13 (1988) (“[I]n general, we can 
expect more extensive Congressional activity when Congress strongly disapproves of the 
result.”). 
116 See Barrett, supra note 9 at 317. 
117 See Farber, supra note 115, at 17 (“Rather than being a domain of tightly 
constraining rules that preclude consideration of broader public values, stare decisis is a 
largely prudential doctrine.”). 
118 Indeed, Eskridge chronicles more than 80 cases in the period between 1961 and 
1986 in which the Supreme Court either explicitly or implicitly overruled its own prior 
statutory interpretation decisions. See Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 2, at 1368 and 
Appendixes A and B (1430-39). 
119 See Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute rule of 
Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 179 (1989) (citing Patterson v. McLean 
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 
(1984))). 
120 See Amanda L. Tyler, Continuity, Coherence, and the Canons, 99 NW. U.L. REV.
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Several rationales have been advanced to support the super-strong 
presumption of statutory stare decisis.  The most prominent are described in 
the following subparts.   
 
1. Congressional acquiescence 
 
The most common argument is that of congressional acquiescence, 
based on Congress’s inaction.  Acquiescence theory is based on the 
assumption that Congress’s silence, or lack of action in response to the 
Court’s interpretation is tantamount to Congress’s endorsement of that 
interpretation.  Thus, the Court has no reason to revisit or overrule its 
interpretation because Congress has implicitly approved it.121 Acquiescence 
theory is reflected in the language typically found in Supreme Court 
statutory stare decisis opinions.  Indeed, the plain language of Justice 
Stevens’s opinion in Smith reveals that he is relying on congressional 
silence as an indication of endorsement.122 
In its simplest form the theory is as follows:  We (the Court) interpreted 
the statute.  You (the legislature) did nothing in response.  We would expect 
you to respond if you did not approve; therefore, you approve.123 Professor 
Eskridge explains the persuasive force of the reasoning by elucidating the 
 
1389, 1417-18 (2005).  Tyler expounds on what might make a precedent “wholly out of 
sync, listing “where the precedent failed to apply a consistently-employed canon, cannot be 
squared with precedents interpreting companion statutory provisions or similarly-worded 
statutes, or has generated only great confusion (as opposed to clarity) in the law.”  Id. 
121 For an in depth treatment of the Supreme Court’s use of congressional inaction as 
an interpretive tool, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative 
Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). 
122 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (“While the relevant 1991 
amendments expanded the coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to 
the subject of age discrimination.  Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title 
VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.”). 
123 Granted, this is the acquiescence theory at its most simplistic.  But, that simplistic 
logic is what often finds its way into the opinions when the Court trots out statutory stare 
decisis as a justification for its interpretation.  Still, Daniel A. Farber has offered a unique 
and more sophisticated public choice theory justification to support acquiescence theory, 
based on the supposed preference of legislators, ex ante, for a rule that would find 
significance in congressional inaction.  Because legislators cannot know at the time of 
enactment whether subsequent judicial interpretations will be favorable or unfavorable to 
them – and, assuming good faith efforts by judges to interpret the statutes accurately, one 
would expect a roughly equal probability of favorable and unfavorable interpretations – 
legislators would prefer a strong statutory stare decisis rule rather than a weak one that will 
impose costs of uncertainty and unreliability.  According to Farber, a legislator will take 
the bargain of allowing mistaken interpretations to stay on the books for the equally likely 
possibility that favorable interpretations will have staying power as well.  See Farber, 
supra, note 115, at 11-13. 
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metaphor of Waddlington, the principal who tells his agent to buy him 
“soupmeat,” and Krattenmaker, the agent who buys beef in response to the 
command.  If Waddlington says nothing to Krattenmaker to correct him or 
repudiate his choice of beef soupmeat, as opposed to chicken or pork, then 
we would presume that Waddlington in fact intends Krattenmaker to 
continue buying beef.124 
The theory, though, is flawed because it begs the central question of 
what meaning should be attached to congressional inaction.  Unlike the case 
of Waddlington and Krattenmaker, often the Congress sitting at the time of 
the Court’s potentially controversial interpretation is different from the 
originally enacting Congress.125 While Waddlington is the same person both 
when he commanded Krattenmaker to get the soupmeat and when 
Krattenmaker brings back the beef, Congress is a “discontinuous 
decisionmaker.”  Eskridge argues that a subsequent Congress’s reaction to a 
Court’s interpretation is not as constitutionally relevant as the intent of the 
enacting Congress.126 Furthermore, Waddlington is motivated to correct 
Krattenmaker if beef is not what he wanted.  He has to eat the beef or go 
hungry.  Congress, on the other hand, is a public decisionmaker.  As such 
Congress, as a collective body,127 has little or no “personal” stake in the 
Court’s interpretation.  In other words, it does not have to eat the beef 
served up by the Court’s interpretation.  Instead, it is forcing the Court’s 
beef onto the public.  While the public may prod Congress to react, there 
are significant obstacles to overcome in that regard.128 
Acquiescence theory has been roundly criticized and largely dismissed 
as insufficient to justify the doctrine of enhanced statutory stare decisis.129 
In particular, Marshall has nicely encapsulated the most practical objections 
 
124 See Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121, at 93. 
125 Id. at 94.  
126 Id. 
127 Eskridge also notes that Congress as a collective decisionmaker cannot be as easily 
assigned a single motivating intent for its action or inaction as can Waddlington, a single 
decisionmaker.  Id. (“While Waddlington may sometimes ‘be of two minds,’ Congress is 
always of two minds (the House and the Senate) and each of them contains many different 
minds.”). 
128 See, e.g., infra notes 131-132, 202-205 and accompanying text. 
129 See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The ‘complicated check on legislation[]’ erected by our Constitution creates 
an inertia that makes it impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional 
failure to act represents (1) approval of the status quo, as opposed to (2) inability to agree 
upon how to alter the status quo, (3) unawareness of the status quo, (4) indifference to the 
status quo, or even (5) political cowardice.” (internal citation omitted)); Eskridge, 
Interpreting, supra note 121, at 95 (“Acquiescence arguments are almost never persuasive 
indicia of actual legislative intent.”). 
Prenkert BIZARRO STATUTORY STARE DECISIS 25 
into four “i”s:  ignorance,130 inertia,131 interpretational ambiguity,132 and 
irrelevance.133 Finally, several commentators have raised constitutional 
objections to the acquiescence justification, because interpretations become 
quasi-legislative while circumventing the constitutional legislative process 
of bicameralism and presentment.134 
2. Task-splitting 
 
While the acquiescence theory seems to provide insubstantial support 
for the doctrine, enhanced statutory stare decisis is justified on several other 
theoretical grounds.  One vision of the justification is based on proper 
resource allocation between Congress and the judiciary.  Lawrence Marshall 
 
130 See Marshall, supra note 136, at 186-90 (Congressional ignorance is as likely to 
lead to inaction as is congressional contemplation and acquiescence).  See also Eskridge, 
Interpreting, supra note 121, at 75 (“One strategy is to show that Congress was not aware 
of the judicial or administrative interpretation and, therefore, could not be charged with any 
form of approval by its failure to overturn it.”). 
131 See Marshall, supra note 119, at 190-91 (Congress is afflicted (by design) with 
issues of organizational inertia that block or frustrate Congress’s ability to pass legislation 
even when a majority of legislators desire it).  See also Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 
121, at 98 (“[T]he structure of Congress makes it far more likely that something will not 
happen (inaction) than that it will (action).”).  Eskridge provides, as an example of this 
truism, the story of Congress’s laborious experience overriding Grove City College v. Bell,
465 U.S. 555 (1984) with the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 
102 Stat. 28 (1988).  Though Grove City never enjoyed the support of committees or the 
full membership of either house of Congress, overriding it required persevering through 
four years of legislative roadblocks, including the introduction of several different versions 
of the bill, a filibuster, and a veto.  All the while, a majority of Congress favored overriding 
Grove City. See Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121, at 99 n.181. 
132 See Marshall, supra note 119, at 191-93 (serious interpretational ambiguity plagues 
any attempt to finding meaning in silence and inaction). 
133 See id. at 193-96 (in other circumstances, the Court adheres to a rule that treats 
subsequent legislative history as irrelevant to the meaning and intent of the enacting 
legislature, so it is odd that this particular post-enactment history (sometimes far removed 
in time and purpose from the original enactment) should be favored over relatively more 
contemporaneous and unambiguous post-enactment history). See also Eskridge, 
Interpreting, supra note 121, at 96 (“The acquiescence . . .cases directly conflict with these 
propositions [that subsequent legislative statements are not useful because they do not 
comply with procedural structures for statutory law found in the constitution]. If 
subsequent legislative statements directly supporting a statutory interpretation are not valid 
evidence, how can subsequent legislative silence, usually just indirectly supporting a 
statutory interpretation, be considered any more authoritative?”) 
134 U.S. CONST. art. I §7. See also Barrett, supra note 9, at 338-39 (summarizing the 
constitutional impediments to the acquiescence rationale); Eskridge, Interpreting, supra 
note 121, at 96; Marshall, supra note 119, at 194 (“Indeed, [acquiescence] is more than 
silly; it is contrary to fundamental constitutional principles.”). 
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calls this the “task-splitting” theory or argument.135 The task-splitting 
argument does not rely on interpreting silence and inaction, but simply 
claims that no great harm is risked when the Court rigidly sticks with its 
statutory interpretations, because Congress is available and empowered to 
act if it desires.  Thus, the Court’s resources are freed up to focus on new 
issues rather than being tasked with constantly revisiting prior 
interpretations.136 As Marshall points out, though, the task-splitting theory 
still suffers from problems of ignorance and inertia.137 In addition, the mere 
fact that Congress is available to override erroneous statutory interpretations 
is not a good reason by itself to allocate the job to it.  Congress is also busy 
and could benefit from having its resources freed for other purposes.  
Correspondingly, the Court is equally available to take on the task of re-
evaluating its prior interpretations and overruling the erroneous ones.138 




Taking up where task-splitting falls short (i.e., providing more than a 
pragmatic justification for allocating the job to Congress) is the argument 
that the Constitution requires the congressional preference based on the 
separation of powers doctrine.139 Justice Hugo Black was the most vocal 
and ardent supporter of this position on the Supreme Court.140 He argued 
that once the Court interpreted, by necessity, ambiguous language, that 
interpretation became like part of the statutory text and the Court would not 
be at liberty to alter or overrule its interpretation, because that would be 
akin to a judicial usurpation of a congressional power.  Justice Black found 
little support for his constitutionalized statutory stare decisis approach.  In 
the end, Justice Black’s approach is insufficiently supported by 
constitutional doctrine,141 as well as seemingly internally inconsistent. 
Specifically, Black advanced no coherent explanation for why the Court’s 
first interpretation is treated as statutory text, but subsequent interpretations 
or modifications would exceed the Court’s constitutional authority.142 
135 Marshall, supra note 119, at 197-98. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 198. 
139 See Barrett, supra note 9, at 325-26, 340-41 (discussing and dismissing this 
argument).   
140 See Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 2, at 1397-1398. 
141 See Barrett, supra note 9, at 341 (explaining that Justice Black “does not identify 
the force that transforms an initial judicial interpretation into statutory text”). 
142 See id.; Eskridge, Overruling, supra note 2, at 1399 (“The argument’s distinction 




Still another justification for strong statutory stare decisis, which is 
likewise grounded in separation of powers considerations, does not claim 
that the constitution prohibits overruling statutory precedents.  Instead, it 
uses the values inherent in the separation of powers doctrine to suggest that 
a heightened rule of statutory stare decisis is a normatively superior, 
constitutionally-based policy.143 According to this approach, the 
countermajoritarian nature of judicial statutory interpretation suggests that 
the Supreme Court should avoid it when possible and accept (indeed, 
perhaps encourage) legislative supremacy with regard to statutory 
policymaking.   Marshall urges the Court to adopt an absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis, in order to send the clear signal that Congress – and 
only Congress – is responsible for fixing any mistakes of judicial 
interpretation.144 If so instructed, the theory is that Congress will be more 
likely to act definitively and quickly to correct mistakes of judicial statutory 
interpretation.145 Congress will no longer have an incentive to “hang back” 
waiting to see if the Court fixes the mistake, which the Court will do from 
time to time without an absolute stare decisis rule.146 Barrett would not go 
 
between acceptable judicial lawmaking (the original interpretation) and the unacceptable 
judicial lawmaking (the overruling) is essentially a semantic one, with no persuasive 
formal justification.”).  
143 See Barrett, supra note 9, at 325-26, 340-41, 348 (advocating a heightened statutory 
stare decisis rule to encourage judicial restraint and to avoid the distrust that accompanies 
Congress’s delegation of policymaking to the federal courts through statutory ambiguity); 
Marshall, supra note 119, at 200-208 (developing the case for an absolute rule of statutory 
stare decisis, aimed at creating an incentive for Congress to assume supremacy). 
144 Marshall, supra note 119, at 211. 
145 Id. (“There should be a marginally higher level of congressional oversight in the 
system in which courts apply a heightened or absolute rule of statutory stare decisis.  For in 
that system the legislators, lobbyists, and public all know that any changes in the 
interpretation of statutes can come only through legislative action – not through a judicial 
reversal  of the announced interpretation.”) 
In this way, Marshall’s absolute rule of statutory stare decisis performs a similar 
function as a preference-eliciting default statutory rule as expounded by Einer Elhauge, 
albeit much less radically.  See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default 
Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2165(2002) [hereinafter Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting]
(“The justification for preference-eliciting canons thus need not rest in their 
correspondence to either legislative preferences or sound policy.  The justification – and 
necessary predicate – is rather that the default result is more likely to be reconsidered (and 
deliberated) by the legislature because it burdens some politically powerful group with 
ready access to the legislative agenda.”)  Both are focused on disciplining the legislature to 
enact its true policy preferences.  Both are more stick than carrot.  Elhauge’s stick is just 
much heavier and sharper.   
146 Marshall, supra note 119, at 213. 
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so far as an absolute rule, in part because she does not seek as a primary 
goal to influence Congress’s actions, but instead to cabin the federal courts’ 
exercise of the dubious policymaking powers inherent in statutory 
interpretation.147 
4. Reliance, Continuity, and Coherence  
 
In two influential articles, Einer Elhauge recently offered a re-imagining 
of dynamic statutory interpretation theory,148 which prompts interpreting 
courts to estimate the enactable preferences of the current legislature – or, 
when discovering those preferences proves impossible, to adopt preference-
eliciting interpretations – rather than focusing solely on the original 
meaning or original purpose of the enacting legislature.  By adopting 
preference-estimating default rules, Elhauge argues that judges are better 
suited to step into the role of the “faithful agent” to the legislature.149 He 
argues that judges are thus constrained from implementing their own views, 
because they must in good faith estimate what enactable preferences the 
current legislature has.  Elhauge sees such enactable preferences only in 
legislative committee reports or other positive legislative actions, not from 
judges’ own estimation of the polity’s preferences.150 This is a somewhat 
restricted role for the judge in comparison to Elhauge’s dynamic theory 
predecessors, who urged judges to consult broad social norms and values to 
update statutes. Obviously, Elhauge and the other dynamic theorists put 
little stock in heightened statutory stare decisis.151 
147 See Barrett, supra note 9, at 348. 
Both Marshall and Barrett recognize that the countermajoritarian problem of judicial 
creativity inherent in interpreting statutes is, at times, unavoidable.  Therefore, they both 
seek to limit it beyond the initial, unavoidable interpretation of ambiguous language.  
Marshall, however, also notes that congressional passivity is a problem with statutory 
interpretation and seeks, with his absolute rule of statutory stare decisis, to shake Congress 
out of that passive role and to step up as the primary authority on statutory interpretation 
and legislating.  See Marshall, supra note 119, at 207. 
Of course, Marshall’s proposal is subject to criticism from a number of perspectives. 
William N. Eskridge, The Case of the Amorous Defendant:  Criticizing Absolute Stare 
Decisis for Statutory Cases, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2450 (1990) (offering a “Speluncean 
Explorers” inspired critique of Marshall’s proposal from law and economics, structuralist, 
and critical legal studies viewpoints). 
148 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 2027 (2002); Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting, supra note 153. 
For a discussion of dynamic statutory interpretation theory, see T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1988); William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1479 (1987).   
149 Elhauge, Preference-Estimating, supra note 148, at 2039-40. 
150 Id. at 2107. 
151 Dynamic theorists as a group presumably would not support a strong statutory stare 
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Largely in response to Elhauge, Amanda L. Tyler has proposed the most 
recent defense of a limited judicial role and a strong doctrine of statutory 
stare decisis.152 Her article “promotes as normatively superior the 
construction of an interpretive regime built on a strong rule of statutory 
stare decisis and consistent application of interpretive guides that advance 
continuity and coherence.”153 Continuity, according to Tyler, calls for 
incremental statutory change by courts and then only when there is some 
considerable indication that the statutory baseline must be upset.154 
Coherence is achieved by “reconciling and harmonizing linguistic meaning 
among numerous interpretations over time.”155 Tyler argues that relying on 
the legislature to affect legislative change allows stronger reliance interests 
to build, because it avoids retroactive application that is inherent in most 
judicial decisions and it will happen with less frequency and more 
deliberation, because legislative amendment is costlier than judicial 
“updating” of statutes.156 
The continuity and coherence values dominating Tyler’s approach 
reflect the continuity policy that Eskridge argues is the basis for all stare 
decisis.157 According to Eskridge, continuity is desirable for three reasons: 
(1) it is the basis for the legitimacy of law, because we feel more secure in 
the rule of law when it does not shift with the blowing winds; (2) it protects 
reliance interests of the public; and (3) it protects the coherence of the 
law.158 Thus, to the extent that a statutory interpretation incorporates these 
policy goals, it should be respected and protected from tinkering.159 
decisis rule and, thus, would wholly reject the Court’s use of it in Smith. The goal of this 
paper, however, is not to advocate for one or another among the various interpretative 
theories.  Rather the paper’s goal is to illustrate why the Smith Court’s application of 
statutory stare decisis was not really traditional statutory stare decisis at all and to advocate 
for a recognition that Bizarro statutory stare decisis is problematic and should not be 
emulated. 
152 Tyler builds on the ideas of David Shapiro, among others.  See, e.g., David L. 
Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U.L. REV. 921 (1992). 
153 Tyler, supra note 120, at 1406. 
154 See id. (“This principle may be understood as viewing statutory change through the 
lens of incrementalism.”)  Eskridge refers to this interest as “‘vertical continuity,’ that is, 
the perseverance of an interpretation over time.”  Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121, at 
70. 
155 Tyler, supra note 120, at 1406.  Eskridge refers to this interest as “‘horizontal 
continuity,’ that is, the coherence of rules and policies at any given time.”  Eskridge, 
Interpreting, supra note 121, at 70.   
156 See id. at 1414.  Cf. Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121 at 70 (arguing that 
congressional inaction should be treated as acquiescence to “building block interpretations” 
by courts, because such interpretations “give[] rise to public or private reliance interests”). 
157 Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121 at 110. 
158 Id. 
159 Eskridge calls interpretations that advance these goals “building block 
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It is important to note that Tyler does not advocate an absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis and makes room for judicial overruling when an 
interpretation has been arrived at without the proper concern for consistency 
or coherence, when an interpretation is inconsistent with a larger statutory 
scheme, or when the statute has caused confusion rather than coherence.160 
III. THE SMITH DECISION: THE ORIGIN OF BIZARRO STATUTORY STARE 
DECISIS AND WHY IT IS BIZARRO 
A.  The Smith Opinion 
 
The Smith Court determined that the ADEA did in fact include a claim 
for disparate impact.  While it is different from the Title VII claim in 
significant and important ways, the Court oddly relied on the 
congressionally overridden interpretation of Title VII in Wards Cove to 
structure the ADEA impact analysis.161 This reliance on Wards Cove is 
Bizarro statutory stare decisis. 
In Smith, a number of police officers aged 40 and over filed a claim of 
age discrimination against the City of Jackson, Mississippi (the City), 
alleging that a pay plan the City adopted and revised between October 1998 
and May 1999, which granted pay increases to all City employees, 
discriminated against officers who were over 40 years old.162 The plan and 
its revision were motivated, at least in part, by the City’s desire to attract 
and retain qualified people, reward performance, and, most notably, to bring 
the starting salaries of police officers in line with comparable positions in 
the region.163 While the plaintiffs claimed that the pay plan was evidence of 
disparate treatment, the relevant issue to the case was their claim that the 
pay plan resulted in proportionately greater raises for less senior officers 
than for those with greater seniority.164 This adverse effect for police 
 
interpretations.”  Id. at 108, 111. 
160 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.  Similarly, Eskridge argues that courts’ 
frequent conclusion in applying statutory stare decisis – that legislative inaction in response 
to an interpretation evinces Congress’s intent that the interpretation is correct – overvalues 
“vertical continuity” (or, in Tyler’s parlance, continuity) and undervalues “horizontal 
continuity” (or coherence).  See Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121, at 70.  Both are 
important, so one should not be sacrificed routinely in service of the other. 
161 Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (“While the relevant 1991 
amendments expanded the coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to 
the subject of age discrimination.  Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title 
VII’s identical language remains applicable to the ADEA.”). 
162 Id. at 231. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
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officers who were over 40 years of age – while a few less senior officers 
were 40 or older, the vast majority of older officers had greater seniority 
and, thus, proportionately lower raises – formed the basis for their disparate 
impact claim.165 
The statistics supported the claim of adverse impact.  In particular, two-
thirds of officers under age 40 received raises greater than 10%, while less 
than half of officers over 40 years old did.166 Second, in terms of average 
percentage increases, the entire class of officers over 40 years old fared 
worse than the younger officers.167 
The District Court granted summary judgment to the City on the 
plaintiffs’ claims and the Fifth Circuit affirmed that decision as to the 
disparate impact claim, determining that the ADEA did not incorporate 
disparate impact theory.168 
The Justices unanimously agreed that the grant of summary judgment to 
the City on the disparate impact claim was appropriate.  Five justices agreed 
that the ADEA incorporated a limited form of disparate impact theory; 
however, Justice Scalia filed a concurring opinion explaining how his 
reasoning differed slightly from the plurality of the other four.  The three 
remaining justices169 disagreed with the majority, concluding that disparate 
impact claims should not be available under the ADEA. 
Justice Stevens’s opinion (which announced the judgment of the Court 
and was, in all but one part, the majority opinion) relied on three 
complementary lines of reasoning.  First, citing the consistency 
presumption, he focused on the similarity of the operative language of Title 
VII and the ADEA.170 Second, he analyzed the specific language of the 
ADEA, particularly the RFOA provision, and determined it also supported 
the contention that the ADEA incorporated disparate impact.171 Third, he 
concluded that the court should defer to the agency interpretations that were 
on point.  Specifically, he noted that “the Department of Labor . . . and the 
EEOC . . . have consistently interpreted the ADEA to authorize relief on a 
disparate-impact theory.”172 Justice Scalia declined to join the plurality in 
the section of Justice Stevens’s opinion focusing on the legislative text and 
intent.  Although he “agree[d] with all of the Court’s reasoning” in that part, 
he did not believe it was necessary as an “independent determination of the 
 
165 Id. at 242. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 231. 
169 Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. 
at 243. 
170 Id. at 233-34. 
171 Id. at 238-39. 
172 Id. at 239.   
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disparate impact question,” instead preferring to use it as a reason to apply 
Chevron deference to the EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA.173 
Justice O’Connor disagreed both with the majority’s reading of the 
statute and with Justice Scalia’s deference to the EEOC.  She found that the 
“reasonable factor other than age” defense in the ADEA174 (not present, of 
course, in Title VII) makes Griggs wholly inapplicable to the ADEA;175 that 
the legislative history of the ADEA made clear that the policy underlying 
disparate impact claims was missing from the ADEA;176 and that the 
Department of Labor and the EEOC were neither consistent in their 
interpretation of the ADEA nor due deference for the interpretation that 
Justice Scalia credited, regardless of that inconsistency.177 
The opinion of the court is important on two bases.  First, it resolved the 
split among the circuit courts.178 Second, and more relevant to this paper, 
the opinion elucidates the proof structure for ADEA disparate impact 
claims.  It is in this portion of the opinion that the Court’s reasoning takes 
the Bizarro turn of relying on Wards Cove despite Congress’s clear 
repudiation of the case.   
The way is more difficult for an ADEA plaintiff who wants to use the 
disparate impact theory.  There are two major hurdles.  The first hurdle 
springs from the notable original179 textual difference between Title VII and 
the ADEA, namely, the “reasonable factor other than age” (RFOA) 
language in § 4(f)(1) of the ADEA.180 For Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, 
and Thomas, this textual difference was dispositive of the threshold 
question of whether the ADEA includes a disparate-impact claim.  For the 
majority, the RFOA provision, instead, “plays its principal role by 
precluding liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a nonage factor 
that was ‘reasonable.’”181 Rather than saddling the defendant with the 
 
173 Id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citing 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).   
174 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000) (“It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take 
any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section . . . 
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age. . . .”). 
175 Smith, 544 U.S. at 251-52 (O’Connor, J. concurring in the judgment). 
176 Id. at 253-54 
177 Id. at 264-65. 
178 See supra notes 55 and 96 and accompanying text.. 
179 I call it “original” because it was a difference between the ADEA and Title VII 
from the ADEA’s initial passage (i.e., the RFOA clause has always been part of the ADEA 
and Title VII has never had a analogous provision) and because I mean to draw a contrast 
between this long-standing difference between the two statutes and the more recent textual 
difference brought about by the 1991 Act’s amendment to Title VII. See supra note 88. 
180 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). For the relevant statutory text of this section see supra note 
175. 
181 Smith, 544 U.S. at 239.   
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burden of proving the “business necessity” defense to escape liability as in 
Title VII disparate impact claims, the ADEA provides defendants with a 
safe harbor from liability when it utilizes some reasonable factor other than 
age, even if that factor results in an adverse impact on older workers.182 
Obviously, what is reasonable need not always be necessary for the 
business’s operation and, therefore, employers are given a much wider berth 
under the ADEA.  The Smith plaintiffs’ disparate-impact claim failed to 
clear this hurdle.  The Court found that the City’s reliance on seniority and 
rank in allocating the pay raises was “unquestionably reasonable given the 
City’s goal of raising employees’ salaries to match those in surrounding 
communities.”183 
The second (and more relevant to this discussion) hurdle was that the 
Court’s pre-1991 Title VII disparate impact decisions would govern ADEA 
disparate impact claims. In particular, the Court relied on Wards Cove.184 
Relying on Bizarro statutory stare decisis, it imported the requirement that 
the plaintiff must “‘isolate[] and identify[] the specific employment 
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical 
disparities.’”185 The Court noted that the police officer plaintiffs in Smith 
failed to isolate the particular practice that led to the disparity in salary 
increases.  In addition, the Court incorporated Wards Cove’s requirement 
that the burden of proof remains at all times with the plaintiff, requiring 
only a burden of production from the employer in defense.186 Although 
Justice Stevens’s opinion for the court did not directly address this issue, he 
does appear to have treated the plaintiffs as though it was their burden to 
prove that the criteria of rank and seniority were unreasonable, rather than 
forcing the City to prove that the criteria were reasonable.187 Justice 
 
182 This is because there are so many criteria that employers might legitimately rely on 
when making employment decisions that are often related to age, unlike the assumptions in 
Title VII regarding race and sex. Id. at 240. 
183 Id. at 242. 
184 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the 
coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age 
discrimination.  Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical 
language remains applicable to the ADEA.”). 
185 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989) (emphasis added) 
(quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)). 
186 Id. 490 U.S. at 659-60. 
187 Smith, 544 U.S. at 242.  This is an odd circumstance given the fairly plain textual 
implication of the RFOA is that it acts as an affirmative defense.  See 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(1) 
(2000) (“It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise 
prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or (e) of this section . . . where the differentiation 
is based on reasonable factors other than age. . . .”).  See also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic 
Power Lab., Docket Nos. 02-7378-cv(L), 02-7474-cv(XAP), 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20941 
at *39-*47 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2006) (Pooler, J., dissenting) (arguing that the RFOA should 
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O’Connor’s opinion makes clear that she believes that the burden of 
persuasion stays at all times with the employee, even as the case turns to the 
RFOA defense.188 
This is particularly striking because Justice Stevens’s opinion employs 
the language of statutory stare decisis in applying Wards Cove to the 
ADEA, relying on the fact that the 1991 Act did not change the language of 
the ADEA which was the identical language at issue in Wards Cove under 
Title VII.189 As previously discussed, relying on congressional silence is 
prototypical statutory stare decisis reasoning.190 However, as discussed 
below, Congress was hardly silent and this is hardly the prototypical 
application of the doctrine of statutory stare decisis.  The next section 
describes why Smith’s invocation of the doctrine distorts and mutates it, 
creating the Bizarro version. 
B.  The Bizarro Nature of Smith’s Reasoning (or Lack Thereof) 
Having described the various theories that may be employed, with 
varying levels of persuasiveness, to justify a doctrine of strong statutory 
stare decisis, this section now turns to evaluating whether the Smith Court’s 
invocation of the doctrine, which I have called “Bizarro,” can be supported 
by any of them.  At the outset it is important to recall that Smith was not a 
run-of-the-mill case for the application of statutory stare decisis.  A typical 
statutory stare decisis case involves a previously-announced interpretation 
of the statutory language at issue and no official, final congressional 
response to that interpretation.  Both of those ordinary characteristics are 
missing in Smith. The statutory language at issue had been previously 
interpreted, but under Title VII, not the ADEA.191 More importantly, 
 
be treated as an affirmative defense based on the plain language of the statute and two 
canons of statutory construction); Transcript of Oral Argument at 3-6, Smith, 544 U.S. 228 
(No. 03-1160) (Justices Stevens, Breyer, and Ginsburg each assume or suggest that the 
RFOA is an affirmative defense), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1160.pdf. 
188 Smith, 544 U.S. 267 (“[O]nce the employer has produced evidence that its action 
was based on a reasonable nonage factor, the plaintiff bears the burden of disproving this 
assertion.”). 
189Id. at 240 (“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the coverage of Title 
VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age discrimination.  Hence, 
Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical language remains applicable 
to the ADEA.”). 
190 See supra Part II.B.1 and infra Part III.B.1. 
191 While the Court was absolutely correct that the identical language in Title VII and 
the ADEA have been traditionally interpreted consistently, see Smith v. City of Jackson, 
544 U.S. 228, 233-234 (2005), it is telling that the language at issue in Smith and to which 
Wards Cove was applied, was not altogether the same as Title VII.  Notably, the RFOA 
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Congress had been anything but silent and inactive in the intervening time.  
In the very Title VII context with which Wards Cove dealt, and with 
specific reference to overriding Wards Cove,192 Congress amended Title VII 
to repudiate the crabbed interpretation of the disparate impact burdens and 
defenses in Wards Cove.
These unique aspects of the Smith case in terms of the application of 
statutory stare decisis to Wards Cove are the origins of the Bizarro nature of 
the statutory stare decisis ultimately brought to life in Smith. The altered 
circumstances portend the origin of the “imperfect duplicate.” For now, I 
will not dwell any more on these unique aspects of Smith’s procedural and 
substantive quirks, other than to note that each is relevant to showing why a 
number of the justifications for strong statutory stare decisis are 
inapplicable to Smith. 
Though Justice Stevens seemed to rely on the acquiescence theory,193 
the following sections will discuss not only whether the acquiescence 
theory supports the application of statutory stare decisis to Wards Cove but 
also the several other justifications discussed in section II.B above. 
 
1. Congressional Acquiescence  
 
Stevens suggested that Congress had been inactive in response to Wards 
Cove as regards the ADEA.194 That is true enough.  The 1991 Act amended 
only Title VII with regard to the disparate impact theory.  Congress took no 
steps to amend the ADEA’s comparable § 4(a)(2).195 But to say that Wards 
Cove was met with congressional inaction would be a gross misstatement.  
Congress “loudly” and definitively wiped out Wards Cove’s primary 
holding.  The 1991 Act specifically referenced to, disapproved of, and 
overrode Wards Cove.196 As with any claim of acquiescence, it is difficult 
 
provision, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000), was a significant textual difference between the 
ADEA and Title VII even prior to the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII.  The Court 
should have recognized that the “limit, segregate, or classify” language of § 4(a)(2), 29 
U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000), which is identical to Title VII’s pre-1991 language in § 
703(a)(2), gained its meaning, in part, by reference to the textually different § 4(f)(1) 
RFOA language.  See Smith, 1125 S.Ct. at 1544-45 (2005).  Rather than reading §§ 4(a)(2) 
and 4(f)(1) together to determine if the RFOA defense might mitigate some of the concerns 
that animated Wards Cove, the Court simply applied Wards Cove’s reasoning. 
192 See supra note 89. 
193 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (“While the relevant 1991 amendments expanded the 
coverage of Title VII, they did not amend the ADEA or speak to the subject of age 
discrimination.  Hence, Wards Cove’s pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII’s identical 
language remains applicable to the ADEA.”). 
194 See id.
195 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2). 
196 Professor Howard Eglit calls an argument similar to this “too simplistic to be 
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to know what signal to draw from that “silence” and “inaction” of 
Congress,197 especially in light of the conspicuous and active response in 
repudiating the Court’s logic and construction in Wards Cove.198 
satisfactory.”  See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991:  Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV.
1093, 1175 (1993).  Though the argument is simple, it is not simplistic.  The argument is, 
in fact, quite powerful.  It strains credulity to suggest that Congress should have to 
comprehensively overhaul the federal code each time it overrides a statutory interpretation.  
To the extent that the Court’s interpretation of statutory language and congress’s override 
of that interpretation is a conversation between coequal branches of government, it is 
unreasonable for the Court to ignore the clear message of Congress that the prior 
interpretation of the same or similar language was simply wrong.   
Professor Eglit also reads much into the 1991 Act’s response to Martin v. Wilks, 490 
U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (allowing a post-order challenge to a consent degree under Title VII, 
even though the challenger had adequate notice that its interests were implicated at the time 
of the entry of the decree).  He argues that Congress’s response to Martin, in which it 
crafted an amendment applying to all federal equal employment opportunity statutes, 
shows that Congress did amend the ADEA when it was specifically concerned with an 
interpretation’s affect on the ADEA. See Eglit, supra, at 1118.  In contrast, he argues, the 
lack of amendment to the ADEA in response to Wards Cove is significant.  The 
comparison, however, is inapt.  Martin was not a case involving the interpretation of a 
specific section of Title VII.  It involved “a principle of general application in Anglo-
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in 
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service 
of process.” Martin, 490 U.S. at 762 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) 
(internal quotes omitted)). Such a general principle, by its nature, had application in many 
contexts.  And, because Martin did not involve the direct interpretation of statutory 
language but rather dealt with a general principle of the administration of courts’ decision-
making powers, simply overriding the holding in Martin by amending Title VII would not 
indicate anything more than that the general principle should not apply to Title VII.  
Therefore, when Congress acted to “undo” the damage done by Martin, it could not simply 
amend Title VII as a signal that the Court’s reasoning was incorrect.  It had to send the 
message that the procedural rule was inapplicable in all civil rights laws.  In such a case, it 
makes sense to expect Congress to define all the contexts in which that procedural rule 
does not apply.  By contrast, when the Court misinterprets the language of a specific 
statute, as it did to Title VII in Wards Cove, it should be enough to send the message that 
the interpretation was wrong by “undoing” that particular interpretation.  At the very least, 
it should be a signal to the Court that the interpretation was disfavored and should not be 
lightly reapplied elsewhere. 
197 See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
198 Indeed Eskridge notes that a sometimes successful argument that overcomes the 
acquiescence theory is “that Congress, even though it has not formally overruled the . . . 
judicial interpretation, has acted as though the interpretation were not the settled one.”  
Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note121, at 76.  This argument grows in strength in the 
context of Smith. Congress has not just “acted” as though Wards Cove were not a settled 
interpretation, it actively overrode it.  Thus, the opinion relied on an overestimation of the 
power of the consistency presumption to overcome this objection, which is odd given the 
Court’s care not to overstate the consistency presumption with regard to the main question 
(i.e., the application of Griggs to the ADEA).  Not just relying on the consistency 
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To expand Professor Eskridge’s Waddlington and Krattenmaker 
metaphor199 to match the situation in Smith, let us assume that Waddlington 
asked Krattenmaker to fetch him some “soupmeat” for his dinner.  
However, when Krattenmaker returned with beef, Waddlington rebuffed 
Krattenmaker by saying, “I cannot stomach beef for dinner.  I wanted 
chicken.”  If Waddlington had also tasked Krattenmaker to fetch 
“soupmeat” for the next day’s lunch, we would think Krattenmaker foolish 
simply to assume that Waddlington had intended him to bring back beef for 
lunch, despite that Waddlington’s rebuff only specifically addressed dinner.  
Given Waddlington’s rejection of beef for one meal, we would expect 
Krattenmaker to seek some sort of clarification regarding the next day’s 
lunch.  Moreover, without a specific instruction from Waddlington to 
Krattenmaker to buy beef, we would likely think it reasonable for 
Krattenmaker to avoid buying Waddlington any beef at all.  Nevertheless, in 
Smith, the Court played the role of the foolish Krattenmaker, assuming that 
the Wards Cove “beef” was still Congress’s “soupmeat” of choice for the 
ADEA’s “lunch,” even though it was resoundingly rejected for Title VII’s 
“dinner.” 
In addition to the weakness of the Smith Court’s reliance on 
acquiescence as illustrated by the foregoing metaphor, the other critiques of 
acquiescence theory reveal problems with the revival of Wards Cove.
a.  Marshall’s four “i”s 
 
Marshall’s four “i”s,200 which are fairly devastating critiques of the 
acquiescence theory, are instructive here.  Congress was certainly not 
ignorant of Wards Cove.  To the contrary it was acutely aware of the 
Court’s interpretation of § 703(a)(2)201 of Title VII as shown by the 1991 
Act’s repudiation of the holding.  On the other hand, Congress was ignorant 
of the fact that the Court would employ this Bizarro form of statutory stare 
decisis and apply Wards Cove to the ADEA. Thus, it may not have been 
motivated to try to amend the ADEA. 
The critique called “inertia,” though likely a misnomer in this instance, 
provides a much stronger critique.  Inertia generally refers to the 
organizational difficulties (structural, political, and constitutional) facing 
any congressional attempt to legislate.  Overriding a statutory interpretation 
 
presumption to apply Griggs, the Court also sought support from the EEOC interpretations 
and other textual cues.  See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240. 
199 See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text  
200 See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text. 
201 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000). 
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is costly.202 In the run-of-the-mill case, the inertia problem involves 
overcoming barriers to developing the sufficient interest, a sense of priority, 
and will; assembling a coalition of interested legislators and stakeholders; 
and undertaking the “painstaking deliberation over whether the decision 
undermines [Congress’s] policies and whether alternatives are desirable.”203 
To be sure, in the case of Wards Cove and the 1991 Act, Congress mustered 
the will and energy to overcome the inertia problem and amend Title VII.  
A critic may ask why, once the “ball was rolling,” Congress did not also 
amend the ADEA’s identical language and why the fact that it did not, 
despite the success of amending Title VII, should not be treated as 
particularly instructive.  But, this criticism misapprehends the costs 
associated with the inertia problem.  Legislating is a delicate balance and 
putting together too broad an agenda or tackling more than necessary can be 
lethal to a legislative undertaking.  Congress accomplished the main goal in 
response to Wards Cove: it directly and clearly repudiated the holding in 
the very context and for the very language that the Court interpreted.  That 
says something instructive about Congress’s disapproval of Wards Cove.
To expect Congress to venture outside the particular statute Wards Cove 
interpreted and to expect an amendment insuring against its application in 
every statute that incorporates a disparate impact claim asks too much. 
Eskridge’s research regarding the efficacy of the interest groups to 
affect legislative change is also relevant here.  His study indicates that only 
where the interests of an influential and organized group have been 
implicated by the interpretation in question does Congress tend to override a 
judicial interpretation.  When groups are scattered or not particularly well-
liked, they typically fail to grab Congress’s attention.204 Typically, older 
workers would fall into the former rather than the latter category; yet, while 
older workers are not diffuse or unpopular, they had no immediate vested 
interest in seeing the ADEA amended in response to a Title VII 
interpretation that was so clearly repudiated by Congress.205 
202 See Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 2, at 335-339. 
203 Id. at 339. 
204 Id. at 360. 
205 But see Harold S. Lewis, Jr., Walking the Walk of Plain Text:  The Supreme Court’s 
Markedly More Solicitous Treatment of Title VII Following The Civil Rights Act of 1991,
49 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1081, 1088 (“In one respect, it is true, the 1991 Amendments shored up 
Title VII only weakly.  In addressing the Court’s 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing 
Co., Inc. v. Atonio, Congress restored the Title VII disproportionate adverse impact proof 
mode . . . far more tepidly and ambiguously than” in other sections.).    
Still, the intent of Congress was clear:  to undo what Wards Cove had done.    
[I]n the interpretive memorandum (which it purported to tell the courts was their 
sole legitimate guide to any legislative history related to Wards Cove), that the job 
relatedness and business necessity defenses an employer must use to justify the 
disproportionate adverse effects of a neutral practice mean that the Supreme Court 
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Interpretional ambiguity refers to the fact that Congress may not act or 
may remain silent in response to a statutory interpretation for a number of 
reasons206 and only one (and perhaps an unlikely one, especially in this 
instance) is that Congress approves.  Indeed, several commentators have 
suggested several different reasons for Congress’s failure to address the 
ADEA in light of Wards Cove, including (1) that Congress saw no reason to 
amend the ADEA in response to a Title VII decision207; (2) that Congress 
did not consider how the ADEA might be affected by an interpretation of 
Title VII and a resulting non-parallel amendment208; or (3) that Congress 
did in fact expect that the 1991 Act’s amendments to Title VII would apply 
to similar statutes like the ADEA, even if those other statutes were not 
amended.209 Therefore, the silence should be scoured for relevant clues to 
clear up the ambiguity.  There are plenty of indicators here that Congress 
sought to repudiate Wards Cove definitively and would not expect it to crop 
up again in the ADEA context. Because Congress will almost never 
override a decision with which it agrees, it seems odd to treat Wards Cove a 
as though it were any other Court precedent. To do so, seems to suggest 
another “i”:  Supreme Court intransigence.210 
had said such defenses meant in its decisions before Wards Cove. 
See id. at 1088-89.  So, Congress sought to wipe Wards Cove from our collective 
memories.  The Smith Court ensured that did not happen. 
206 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text. 
207 See Eglit, supra note 196, at 1174-75.  Ultimately, although Professor Eglit argues 
that Wards Cove should apply in the ADEA context, the basis for that conclusion is weaker 
than it appears at first glance.  He states Title VII decisions have “potent analogical force” 
for interpreting the ADEA.  Id. at 1215.  See also id. at 1183 n.303.  That is a much lesser 
claim than that Wards Cove must apply to the ADEA.  Of special note in this regard, is the 
fact that the decision that warranted a much stronger claim of “potent analogical force” to 
the ADEA (namely, Griggs, which has never been questioned by Congress, but was in fact 
endorsed in the 1991 Act) warranted extensive discussion in Smith as to whether it should 
apply.  Thus, it is quite odd that the far weaker claim of analogical force that applies to 
Wards Cove would warrant almost no discussion. See Smith, 544 U.S. at 240.  That is 
especially true in light of the differences between the ADEA and Title VII, which are quite 
relevant to the concerns addressed in Wards Cove. See infra Part V.  
208 Eglit, supra note 196, 1168-70. 
209 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 4, 421 (2003) (noting that a committee report from the House Judiciary 
Committee stated that the laws that were based on the Title VII framework and language, 
like the ADEA, should be interpreted consistently with Title VII’s post-1991 Act amended 
language; however, this report was not part of the Senate Bill that was ultimately adopted 
as the 1991 Act.). 
210 One can almost imagine the Justices saying, “Ha!  You didn’t like Wards Cove, but 
we thought it was the correct interpretation.  So, even though you immediately obliterated 
it, we’re going to keep using it until you tell us we can’t!”  Cf. Schnapper, supra note 62at 
1100 (“No one but an incorrigible judicial recidivist would consider instead applying to 
[the 1991 Act and eight other corrective statutes where Congress overrode Court 
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The general irrelevance of post-enactment legislative pronouncements, 
though typically sound, lacks bite in this instance.  This is not your 
everyday post-enactment activity.  Congress has tipped its hand to a fairly 
clear policy decision that the interests and concerns that supposedly 
underlie Wards Cover are unworthy of credence. In conjunction with the 
other “i”s, the irrelevance concern actually raises important criticisms of 
Bizarro statutory stare decisis. 
 
b. Constitutional concerns 
 
The article I concerns underlying the acquiescence theory also loom 
large in the Smith case.211 The will of Congress to repudiate Wards Cove,
as embodied in the 1991 Act, survived a bicameral vote and the presentment 
process.  It was not vetoed.  It has been enacted.  The Smith court ostensibly 
decided to treat Wards Cove – a statutory interpretation that was repudiated 
by Congress and such repudiation was endorsed by the President’s signature 
on the 1991 Act – as a legally binding precedent because Congress did not 
specifically say it should not be.  That directly implicates the concerns (i.e., 
Congress’s avoidance of the article I legislation and policymaking 
requirements) that Barrett, Marshall, and Eskridge raise.212 In effect, it 
elevates the interpretation of the unelected judges over Congress’s 
expressed will.   
Congressional “silence” and “inaction” in the context of the ADEA in 
response to Wards Cove is simply too flimsy a tool to resurrect Wards Cove 




The task-splitting justification seems quite inapt in the case of Smith. 
To the extent that a task was allocated to Congress, it carried that task out in 
response to Wards Cove.  It overrode Wards Cove as regards Title VII, 
 
interpretations] the very defective interpretive methodology that the Congress condemned 
in enacting those corrective laws.  The lessons to be learned from these nine statutes, and 
from the sixteen short-lived decisions they overturned [including Wards Cove], are not 
limited to the particular provisions misinterpreted and then amended or to civil rights.”). In 
fairness, this characterization of intransigence is not only a bit intemperate, but also 
probably excessive, because Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion adopting the Wards 
Cove standards in Smith, filed a strong dissent in Wards Cove itself.  See Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 662-679 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  It is doubtful he 
relished the opportunity to resurrect unfair.  He does, however, have a pattern of strong 
deference to precedent. 
211 See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
212 See id.
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making clear in the legislative history that the 1991 Act’s amendments were 
expected to set disparate impact law back to pre-Wards Cove settings.213 In 
addition, the issue of inertia (or, more aptly for this situation, the 
institutional, structural, and political roadblocks that face a congressional 
attempt to override a statutory precedent) discussed above plagues the task-
splitting justification as much as the acquiescence theory.  The task that 
Bizarro statutory stare decisis allocates to Congress is onerous.  
Furthermore, It requires congressional conjecture and encourages tinkering 
with statutes.  It seems much more efficient to treat the situation as one 
involving an interpretation of first impression, allocating to the Court the 
work of interpreting any ambiguity, just as it typically would, and allocating 
to Congress the job of monitoring the correctness of that interpretation. 
Indeed, it would be odd to justify Smith’s invocation of statutory stare 
decisis on a task-splitting argument, because Bizarro statutory stare decisis 
potentially creates more work for both branches. 
 
3. Separation of powers  
 
Because the Constitution-based separation of powers justification for 
strong statutory stare decisis has never gained much support beyond Justice 
Hugo Black and because it is subject to a set of fairly devastating 
critiques,214 it will not be addressed here.  It does not provide an 
independent justification for treating Wards Cove as vaunted precedent. 
If the goal of statutory stare decisis is to reflect the values embodied in 
the separation of powers doctrine, then the application of the strong 
statutory stare decisis rule to Wards Cove in Smith fails on that count.  
Marshall’s conception is that the strong stare decisis rule will act as a spur 
to Congress to override precedents it dislikes.215 Here that is exactly what 
happened.  It’s not clear that the next step of requiring Congress to head off 
the possibility of that interpretation being applied in every related context 
should be required to fulfill Marshall’s goals under even the absolute rule of 
statutory stare decisis he advocates.  Barrett’s judicial restraint 
justification216 does little more to support the application of Wards Cove to 
the ADEA.  The alternative to Bizarro statutory stare decisis217 does not 
undermine Barrett’s preference for judicial restraint.  It would require the 
Court to do the work of interpretation, not re-interpretation of a settled 
issue.  In Smith, that would likely result in the Court recognizing the 
 
213 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
217 See infra Part V. 
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differences between the concerns in Wards Cove and the structure of the 
ADEA, especially in light of the RFOA defense.218 That is not judicial 
activism or illegitimate judicial policy making at its worst.  For the Court to 
resurrect a repudiated and overridden precedent is likely just as activist (if 
not more) and in need of restraint. 
 
4. Reliance, continuity, and coherence 
 
Tyler claims that a strong doctrine of stare decisis supports reliance 
interests by creating a sense of continuity and coherence in the statutory 
legal landscape.219 In terms of reliance, there was but little reliance on 
anything related to the disparate impact claim under the ADEA.220 After a 
decade of uncertainty following the Hazen Paper case and following the 
dismissal of the Adams certiorari petition as improvidently granted,221 
parties relied on anything related to the ADEA and disparate impact at their 
own risk.  The law was too unsettled and fractured to induce any reasonable 
reliance.  Wards Cove was no “building block interpretation” upon which 
the public or private parties had grown to rely in ordering their affairs under 
the ADEA.222 Eskridge describes three characteristics of building block 
interpretations.223 Wards Cove had none of them.  That Congress overrode 
Wards Cove is enough to undermine its authority. That the circuits were 
split regarding whether disparate impact was even available under the 
ADEA undermines any claims that Wards Cove was either well-settled or 
induced reliance. 224 There is no evidence that Congress or any agency, like 
the EEOC, acted in reliance on Wards Cove applying to ADEA disparate 
impact cases when developing additional legislation or rules. 
In terms of Tyler’s conceptions of continuity and coherence, the revival 
of a definitively overridden interpretation does more violence to continuity 
 
218 See id. 
219 See supra notes 152-60 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra Part I.B.2. 
221 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
222 Professor Eskridge contends that reliance interests support a presumption of 
correctness for “building block interpretations.”  Building block interpretations are those 
that are “authoritative, well-settled interpretations upon which public and/or private parties 
reasonably rely to carry out their roles under the statute.”  Eskridge, Interpreting, supra 
note 121, at 108. 
223 Id. at 111 (the three characteristics are that the interpretation is “authoritative and 
settled” and “set[s] a firm direction for the statute’s development”; that the interpretation 
has led to reliance by parties who are subject to the statute; and that the interpretation is 
one upon which Congress or other lawmakers have relied when crafting additional related 
legal rules). 
224 Nevertheless, some courts that found the ADEA included disparate impact claims 
prior to Smith also assumed that Wards Cove applied. 
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and coherence than heightened statutory stare decisis does to support it.   In 
fact, according to Tyler’s own model, certain circumstances warrant 
deviation from a strong commitment to statutory stare decisis.225 In 
particular, applying Wards Cove in Smith did not show the proper concern 
for consistency or coherence, it is inconsistent with both Title VII’s and the 
ADEA’s statutory schemes, and Wards Cove caused confusion rather than 
coherence.226 
IV. THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF BIZARRO STATUTORY STARE DECISIS:
BIZARRO GOES EXPLORING 
None of the justifications for heightened statutory stare decisis supports 
the Smith Court’s Bizarro version.  If Smith, though, were an anomaly, we 
could simply dismiss it as a poorly reasoned, but limited, decision.  Bizarro 
statutory stare decisis is not so limited, however.  It has been loosed and 
could turn up in a number of contexts.  If so, its effects would be far from 
positive. 
 
A.  The Effects of Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis:  A Shift in the Balance of 
Power 
 
Bizarro statutory stare decisis raises significant concerns, most 
especially by placing an impracticable burden on Congress and by altering 
the balance of lawmaking power between Congress and the Court.  First, if 
the Court were to routinely invoke Bizarro statutory stare decisis as it did in 
Smith, Congress would bear the burden of identifying every possible statute 
to which a disfavored statutory interpretation of the Court might be 
extended.  Because the Court hears so few cases, its statutory interpretations 
(especially those involving theories of recovery or allocations of burdens) 
are used as benchmarks or models in a number of other statutory contexts.  
Indeed the Title VII disparate impact doctrine has been applied to several 
other statutes.227 Were Smith’s Bizarro statutory stare decisis to be 
generally accepted, Congress would be hard pressed to repudiate 
definitively and override an interpretation by the Court.  To do so would 
require Congress to canvass the entire statutory landscape for potential 
statutes to which the Court might extend the interpretation that meets with 
 
225 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
226 Id. 
227 See Eglit, supra note 196, at 1150 n.200 (collecting cases illustrating other contexts 
in which Title VII disparate impact has been used as a model or guide, including the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and numerous state 
statutes). 
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congressional disapproval.  That is impractical and unworkable.228 When 
Congress kills an interpretation, it should be able to presume that the Court 
will not resurrect that interpretation without some particularly compelling 
indication that the interpretation is warranted with regard to the related 
statute. 
Furthermore, Bizarro statutory stare decisis shifts the balance of power 
toward Court and away from Congress, in effect making Congress a 
reactive body to the Court’s policymaking.  That state of affairs raises 
serious countermajoritarian concerns.229 
So what? 
If Smith were just an isolated mistake, then the effort to criticize it might 
be nothing more than futile pedantry.  But, Smith is no anomaly.  Even .if 
we limit our inquiry to the Title VII/ADEA interaction, the 1991 Act 
overrode a number of Supreme Court interpretations by amending Title VII.  
As with Wards Cove, Congress did not typically amend the ADEA as 
well.230 Thus, Bizarro statutory stare decisis can, and likely will, be a 
menace in other contexts.  The following section provides one such 
example.231 
B.  An Example:  Price Waterhouse and the Mixed-Motive Case 
 
Ann Hopkins was denied partnership in Price Waterhouse, a national 
professional accounting partnership.232 She claimed Price Waterhouse 
 
228 Cf. Schnapper, supra note 62, at 1147 (“When a new piece of legislation addresses 
an issue with an increased degree of specificity, it is often impracticable for Congress to 
review every related or analogous existing statute to insert the same language.  Rather than 
giving such later specific legislation the effect of narrowing earlier laws , the Court should 
look to the more specific subsequent legislation as a guide to interpreting the earlier more 
general measures.”). 
229 On the countermajoritarian difficulty, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST 
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962). 
230 See supra note 196. 
231 An example in the opposite direction is found in EEOC v. Arab Am. Oil Co., 499 
U.S. 244 (1991) (“Aramco”).  In 1983, Congress amended the ADEA in response to several 
judicial opinions that concluded the ADEA could not be applied extraterritorially to protect 
from age discrimination American citizens working abroad for American firms.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 623(h)(1) (2000).  At least some Congressmembers thought that, by so amending 
it to specifically authorize extraterritorial coverage, the ADEA would become coextensive 
with the coverage of Title VII. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 273 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
Nevertheless, in Aramco, the Court held that Title VII did not apply to American citizens 
working for American companies abroad, relying for support on the fact that Title VII was 
not similarly amended.  See id. at 256. 
232 More accurately, in her first year as a partner candidate, she was “held” for 
reconsideration and, subsequently, never again proposed as a candidate. See Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 and 233 n.1 (1989). 
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denied her the opportunity based on her sex.233 Price Waterhouse claimed 
Hopkins had distinct personality problems that alienated her from those 
with whom she worked, including the claim that she was abusive to 
employees whom she supervised.234 Those personality problems, Price 
Waterhouse argued, doomed Hopkins’s prospects for partnership, not any 
consideration of her sex.  The dispute made its way to the Supreme Court. 
In a fractured set of opinions with a four justice plurality,235 two 
separate concurrences,236 and a dissent by the remaining justices,237 the 
Court handed Hopkins a victory.  The Court ruled that a plaintiff could 
prevail on a claim pursuant to Title VII in a “mixed-motives” case.238 
Specifically, the Court found that, even if Price Waterhouse was motivated 
to deny partnership to Ann Hopkins based on her allegedly negative 
personality characteristics that were unrelated to her sex, it also was 
motivated to reject her based Hopkins’s failure to live up to stereotypes of 
proper feminine behavior and characteristics.  That reliance on sex 
stereotypes is prohibited by Title VII.  Thus, the four justices in the 
plurality, as well as Justice O’Connor and Justice White in concurrence, 
agreed that when a plaintiff shows that the employer relied upon the 
plaintiff’s protected characteristic when it made an adverse employment 
decision about him or her, the plaintiff has carried his or her burden under 
Title VII, even if the employer also relied on other, legitimate criteria.239 
For an interesting first-hand account of the case and its antecedent facts, see ANN 
BRANIGAR HOPKINS, SO ORDERED: MAKING PARTNER THE HARD WAY (1996). 
233 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 231. 
234 Id. at 234-35. 
235 Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined the opinion authored by Justice 
Brennan. Id. at 230-58. 
236 Justice White and Justice O’Connor each wrote a concurring opinion.  Id. at 258-
79. 
237 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined the dissent, which as written by 
Justice Kennedy. Id. at 279-95. 
238 See id. at 246-47 (using the “mixed-motives case” label).  The plurality noted that 
the idea of a mixed-motives case had its origin in a constitutional employment claim.  Id. at 
248-49 (citing and discussing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), in 
which a public school teacher sued the board of education for firing him in violation of his 
free speech rights under the First Amendment).  Indeed, Justice White relied primarily on 
this precedent in his concurrence.  Id. at 258 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In 
my view, to determine the proper approach to causation in this case, we need look only to 
the Court’s opinion in [Mt. Healthy].” (citation omitted)). 
239 The judges in the plurality and the two concurring judges used different wording to 
describe what the plaintiff must show.   The plurality indicated that sex needed to play a 
“motivating part in an employment decision.” Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality 
opinion).  Justice Brennan, writing for the plurality, elaborated by saying that the “because 
of” language means “that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” Id. at 240.  
Justice White would have required a showing that sex was a “substantial factor,” Id. at 260 
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Nevertheless, the court also held that the employer could entirely escape 
liability under Title VII by proving an affirmative defense240 that it would 
have made the same challenged employment decision even had it not 
considered the illegal criterion.241 
At the root of the plurality’s logic was the recognition that the “because 
of” language in Title VII242 did not require a plaintiff to prove that his or her 
protected status was the “but for” cause of the challenged employment 
action.  Instead, the statute required a lesser causal standard.243 The 
plurality explained:  “In saying that gender played a motivating part in an 
employment decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the 
moment of the decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful 
response, one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was 
a woman.”244 The four justices in the plurality and two concurring justices 
 
(White, J., concurring), as would have Justice O’Connor. Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
240 Justice O’Connor did not view this escape hatch as an affirmative defense as the 
plurality did.  Instead, she believed that when a plaintiff carried his or her burden under the 
mixed motives case, the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to prove that the 
illegal criterion was not the “but for” cause of the employment decision. See id. at 263 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  The dissent, likewise, ridiculed the plurality’s characterization 
of it as an affirmative defense, calling the plurality’s approach “nothing more than a label.” 
Id. at 286 (dissenting opinion).  See infra note 243 for a discussion of why this 
disagreement was related to a disagreement over the causal standard required to show a 
violation of Title VII. 
241 Id. at 244-45 (plurality opinion).  This is known as the “same decision defense.”  A 
related holding of the Court was that the defendant’s burden of proof under the same 
decision defense was to make its showing by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 254 
(plurality opinion).  The court below had required clear and convincing evidence. Id. 
242 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race , color, religion, sex, or 
national origin . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
243 There was not complete agreement about what that lesser standard should be among 
the justices who nevertheless agreed that the “but for” standard was not required.  Notably, 
Justice O’Connor distanced herself from the plurality on this point as well, arguing that the 
language of Title VII did, in fact, require “but for” causation, but was silent as to which 
party carried the burden of persuasion (and the attendant risk of nonpersuasion) regarding 
“but for” causation.  Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262-63 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (“Thus, I disagree with the plurality’s dictum that the words ‘because of’ do 
not mean ‘but for’ causation; manifestly they do.”)  The dissent adopted the same reading 
of the plurality’s framework as Justice O’Connor, but disagreed that the burden shift was 
appropriate.  Id. at 285-86 (dissenting opinion).  See supra note 240 for a related discussion 
of the plurality’s and Justice O’Connor’s disagreement over whether a mixed motives case 
involves an affirmative defense or a shift in the burden of persuasion. 
244 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250.  But see Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content 
of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment 
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agreed that the district court and the court of appeals in Hopkins’s case had 
not erred in finding that Hopkins presented sufficient evidence to carry her 
burden under that lesser causal standard.245 The plurality argued that once 
sex was shown to be a motivating part of the decision, as Hopkins had done, 
the plaintiff’s burden of proof was satisfied, because “when . . . an employer 
considers both gender and legitimate factors at the time of making a 
decision, that decision was ‘because of’ sex and other, legitimate 
considerations – even if we may say later, in the context of litigation, that 
the decision would have been the same if gender had not been taken into 
account.”246 This, of course, stands in stark contrast to the burden placed on 
the plaintiff under the McDonnell Douglas framework,247 which seemingly 
requires the plaintiff to show that the illegal motive was the employer’s one, 
true motive.248 
It was Justice O’Connor’s concurrence, however that lower courts and 
many commentators treated as Price Waterhouse’s operative holding, 
because her approach was the most restrictive.249 Justice O’Connor 
 
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (1995) (arguing that this standard erroneously 
conflates motive and intent, as well as that it is inconsistent with a cognitive understanding 
of discrimination, in which an employer likely cannot accurately pinpoint the reasons for 
its decisions, including stereotypes, which operate on an automatic and unconscious level). 
245 See id. at 251 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); 
id. at 272 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Hopkins presented evidence of sex-based comments made directly to her (e.g., that she 
should “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-
up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry”), id. at 235, sex-based comments that were 
included in evaluation forms solicited from the Price Waterhouse partners, id., and expert 
testimony of a social psychologist regarding the mechanics and presence of sex 
stereotyping in the evaluation process, id. at 235-36. 
246 Id. at 241.   
247 See McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  The McDonnell Douglas 
framework is often used to prove and to evaluate the evidence in cases claiming disparate 
treatment employment discrimination pursuant to Title VII, as well as the ADEA, and the 
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990.  See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 
44, 124 S. Ct. 513, 517-18 (2003) (analyzing an ADA claim using the McDonnell Douglas 
framework); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) 
(assuming, but not holding, that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies in ADEA 
cases); O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996) (same). 
248 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246-47. 
249 See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 765 n.9 (1988) 
(“[W]hen no single rationale commands a majority, ‘the holding of the Court may be 
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the 
narrowest grounds.’” (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977))).  But see 
Benjamin C. Mizer, Note:  Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate 
Treatment Claims, 100 MICH. L. REV. 234 (2001) (arguing that it is odd to treat as 
controlling a proposition (i.e., the requirement of direct evidence) that was clearly not 
endorsed by a majority of the court and citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 
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explained that she would require a Title VII plaintiff to produce “direct 
evidence” 250 that the plaintiff’s protected status was a substantial factor in 
the employer’s challenged decision, before the burden would shift to the 
employer to justify that decision absent the illegal consideration.251 The 
plurality made no such explicit distinction between direct and circumstantial 
evidence to separate mixed-motives cases from “pretext” cases.  Even so, 
Justice O’Connor failed to provide a clear distinction between the two types 
of evidence.  She defined her notion of direct evidence in the negative (i.e., 
citing a few examples of what it was not252) and then explained that 
Hopkins’s evidence fit the bill.253 Thus, the bifurcation of individual 
disparate treatment law between a Price Waterhouse mixed-motives case 
and a McDonnell Douglas pretext case was premised on the character of the 
plaintiff’s evidence, direct or circumstantial.  Unsurprisingly, the lower 
courts struggled, without success, for consistency under this paradigm.254 
Price Waterhouse, like Wards Cove, was in Congress’s crosshairs in the 
early 1990s.  And, like Wards Cove, it was overridden in part by  the 1991 
Act.255 Specifically, Congress took aim at Price Waterhouse by allowing a 
 
1176, 1183 (2d Cir. 1992), for making the same argument). 
250 Courts have had a notoriously difficult time in employment discrimination cases 
identifying direct evidence or defining the difference between direct and circumstantial 
evidence.  One commentator calls the distinction “illusory.”  See Stephen W. Smith, Title 
VII’s National Anthem:  Is there a Prima Facie Case for the Prima Facie Case, 13 LAB.
LAW. 367 (1997).  Another questions whether true direct evidence of an employer’s intent 
to discriminate is possible to find, because even an admission of discriminatory intent by 
the employer or an employer’s agent requires the factfinder to infer that the decisionmaker 
knew his or her own mind and motives and is able to report accurately those motives.  See 
Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet:  Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. 
REV. 2229, 2321 n.290 (1995). 
251 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“In 
my view, in order to justify shifting the burden on the issue of causation to the defendant, a 
disparate treatment plaintiff must show by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was 
a substantial factor in the decision.”). 
252 Id. at 277 (explaining that “stray remarks in the workplace,” “statements by 
nondecisionmakers,” and “statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional 
process” are each, “standing alone,” not direct evidence for purposes of shifting the burden 
of causation to the defendant under the mixed-motives approach). 
253 Id. 
254 See, e.g., Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with 
Direct Evidence of Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 303 (2003) (discussing the 
various approaches to classifying direct and circumstantial evidence that developed after 
Price Waterhouse and arguing that the distinction between mixed-motives and pretext 
cases results in courts undervaluing evidence of biased oral comments that are not 
considered “direct” evidence) 
255 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, at 45-48 (1991) (reporting on a substantially similar 
earlier version of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and explaining the “need to overturn Price 
Waterhouse”). 
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plaintiff to prove a violation of the statute through the lesser “motivating 
factor” causation standard. 256 Furthermore, Congress converted the “same 
decision” defense,257 as announced in Price Waterhouse, from an 
affirmative defense regarding liability to a remedy limitation.   Section 107 
of the 1991 Act, which amended sections 703258 and 706259 of Title VII, 
was the vehicle for this change.   
As it did in response to Wards Cove, Congress amended Title VII in 
response to Price Waterhouse’s restrictive interpretation of language that 
appears in identical form in the ADEA.260 And, again, Congress did not 
amend the ADEA in the 1991 Act in response to Price Waterhouse. Smith’s 
Bizarro statutory stare decisis doctrine would find the fact that Congress did 
not amend the ADEA in response to Price Waterhouse determinative.  The 
operative holding of Price Waterhouse would apply with continuing force 
to the ADEA. 261 But that is wholly unsatisfying.   
 
256 Presumably, Congress’s use of “motivating factor” and not “substantial motivating 
factor” was not an oversight, but was a specific choice of the plurality’s – not Justice 
O’Connor’s and Justice White’s – view of the causal standard.  See supra note 239. 
257 See supra note 241 and accompanying text. 
258 Section 703(m) now reads: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment practice is 
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even 
though other factors also motivated the practice. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000). 
259 As amended, section 706(g)(2)(B) now reads: 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of 
this title [section 703(m)] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent 
would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating 
factor, the court –  
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), 
and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only 
pursuant to a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title [section 703(m)]; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, 
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A) 
[dealing with backpay and other victim-specific relief]. 
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 
260 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) with 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
261 To complicate matters, there is an argument that the RFOA provision obviates the 
question, because it is a safe harbor for employers in mixed-motives cases.  So, there really 
is no “mixed-motives” case under the ADEA.  See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. at 253 (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he RFOA provision also plays a distinct . . . role in "mixed-motive" 
cases. In such cases, an adverse action taken in substantial part because of an employee's 
age may be ‘otherwise prohibited’ by § 4(a). The RFOA exemption makes clear that such 
conduct is nevertheless lawful so long as it is ‘based on’ a reasonable factor other than 
age.” (internal citations omitted)); Transcript of Oral Argument at 51, Smith, 544 U.S. 228 
(No. 03-1160), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-1160.pdf. 
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Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion – in particular the direct vs. 
circumstantial evidence issue –  has been widely criticized and, in fact, has 
recently been revealed as likely wrong in the first place.  In Desert Palace, 
Inc. v. Costa,262 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer “whether a 
plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a 
mixed-motive instruction under Title VII . . ., as amended by the [1991 
Act].”263 Its answer was a resounding, unanimous264 no.  The Court found 
that a plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed according to the 
motivating factor standard of section 703(m)265 when he or she has 
produced sufficient evidence to support that contention, without regard to 
whether that evidence is direct or circumstantial.266 
The Court based its holding on reading the statute according to three 
basic principals.  First, the text of the statute makes no mention of a direct 
evidence requirement.267 Second, 703(m) applies if the plaintiff 
“demonstrates” an impermissible motive.  “Demonstrates” is a defined term 
in the statute:  meeting the burdens of production and persuasion.268 The 
Court reasoned that it must interpret that term accurately and consistently.  
Accuracy required that the Court not read a direct evidence requirement into 
the definition without clear intent from Congress that it should.269 The 
Court found no such indication of congressional intent.270 Moreover, 
consistency required that the use of the term “demonstrates” in section 
703(m) be given the same meaning in section 706(g)(2)(B), the same 
decision defense.  Notably, the defendant argued that it had no direct 
evidence requirement to prove the same decision defense.271 Thus, the 
Court refused to interpret the same term differently in the two related 
 
262 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
263 Id. at 92. 
264 Note that even Justice O’Connor agreed that her direct evidence standard from 
Price Waterhouse was not incorporated in section 703(m); however, she did write a 
separate concurring opinion to reiterate her view that the Price Waterhouse direct evidence 
rule was appropriate prior to being supplanted by Congress.  Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
265 The Court continued to use the term mixed-motives instruction rather than 
motivating factor instruction despite the absence of the former in the statutory language.  
See id. at passim.
266 Id. at 101 (“In order to obtain an instruction under [section 703(m)], a plaintiff need 
only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that ‘race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for 
any employment practice.’”). 
267 Id. at 98-99 (“On its face, the statute does not mention, much less require, that a 
plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct evidence.”). 
268 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000). 
269 Costa, 523 U.S. at 99. 
270 Id. 
271 Id. at 101. 
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sections of Title VII without some clear indication from Congress that it 
should.272 Finally, the Court relied on the “conventional rule of civil 
litigation” that circumstantial evidence is no less adequate or convincing 
than direct evidence.273 The Court drove home its point with the following:  
“The reason for treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both 
clear and deep-rooted:  ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but 
may also be more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct 
evidence.’”274 As a result, Justice O’Connor’s evidentiary dichotomy was 
undone.275 
Nevertheless, lower courts still struggle with whether Price 
Waterhouse’s formulation of the mixed-motives theory applies to the 
ADEA.276 Bizarro statutory stare decisis would short circuit any reasoned 
consideration of the question. 
 
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: PUTTING BIZARRO TO REST 
The real question that the Court should have addressed in Smith )and 
that Courts should consider with regard to Price Waterhouse) was not 
whether Congress’s inaction with regard to the ADEA should be read as an 
endorsement of Wards Cove. Instead, the Court should have focused on the 
appropriate structure of a disparate impact claim, including the allocation of 
the burdens of proof, according to the text, purpose, and legislative history 
of the ADEA.277 This approach is really just statutory interpretation in the 
first instance.  Perhaps the overridden interpretation is the correct one; 
however, without indicators in the text, purpose, or history of the related 
statute that are even stronger indicators of correctness of the interpretation 
 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 100. 
274 Id. (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)). 
275 Justice O’Connor wrote a brief concurring opinion in Costa to note that she agreed 
with the majority opinion in that the 1991 Act’s amendments “codified a new evidentiary 
rule for mixed-motive cases arising under Title VII.”  Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
She maintained, however, that the requirement in her concurrence to trigger the mixed-
motives analysis was the appropriate rule prior to the amendments. Id. 
276 Compare Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding 
applicable to the ADEA the Costa conclusion that circumstantial evidence may be used to 
support a mixed-motives claim) with Glanzman v. Metropolitan Mgmt. Corp., 391 F.3d 
506 n. 3 (3rd Cir. 2004) (“Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not apply to ADEA 
cases . . . we continue to apply the Price Waterhouse test in order to resolve ADEA 
cases.”).  
277 Cf. Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121, at 97 (“The formal question [with which 
the Court should concern itself in the 1989 case of Patterson v. McLean Credit Union] is 
whether the text and legislative history of section 1981 itself support Runyon [v. 
McCrary].”). 
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than were present in the statute for which the interpretation was overridden, 
it should not be applied.  The text, purpose, and history of the ADEA do not 
make a strong case for applying Wards Cove. In fact, the presumption 
against the overridden interpretation should be even stronger in the context 
of the civil rights and equal employment opportunity statutes, because the 
Supreme Court’s limiting interpretations have been consistently repudiated 
Congress.278 The Court should have should have been particularly loathe to 
resurrect Wards Cove, which had already met with disapproval.279 
The Court in Smith should have recognized that there was no strong 
justification for treating Wards Cove like binding precedent.280 It had not 
induced any significant reliance by either parties or lawmakers.  
Resurrecting Wards Cove did not significantly enhance the consistency or 
coherence of the law. Whether the ADEA even allowed disparate impact 
 
278 See Schnapper, supra note 62, at 1098 (quoting Rep. Ford from 137 CONG. REC.
H9533 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) as indicating that the 1991 Act would send “a powerful 
message that the American people reject the Supreme Court’s narrow and crabbed 
interpretation of civil rights laws generally and equal employment opportunity statutes 
specifically) and 1100 (referring to “judicial recidivists”). 
279 The interaction between the courts and Congress leading up to and following 
Aramco could have provided guidance to the Court in Smith. In that case, the Court had to 
determine whether Congress intended Title VII to apply extraterritorially to American 
citizens working for American companies abroad. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 246 (1991).  In 
interpreting Title VII not to have extraterritorial reach, the Court relied on the fact that 
Congress had previously amended the ADEA to clarify its extraterritorial application after 
several courts had interpreted it not to apply outside the United States.  Congress did not 
likewise amend Title VII.  Id. at 258.  See also supra note 231 (explaining that some 
Congressmembers were convinced that the amendment to the ADEA was necessary to 
make it coextensive with Title VII).  Aramco was not an application of Bizarro statutory 
stare decisis because the Court only mentioned the ADEA amendment to “buttress” its 
conclusion, noting that it was evidence that Congress understood how to make its intent of 
extraterritorial application clear.  Id. But that falls short of formally granting statutory stare 
decisis to the limiting interpretations of the ADEA that prompted Congress to amend it.  
So, Congress narrowly interpreted Title VII, refusing to recognize that the amendment to 
the ADEA was a message that Congress intended the federal equal employment 
opportunity statutes to have broad remedial application.  In the end, Congress had to 
override Aramco in the 1991 Act to clarify its intent for Title VII to apply extraterritorially.  
See Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, §109 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000)).   
Some give-and-take between the Court and Congress is inevitable.  But, the seemingly 
continual cycle of crabbed and limiting interpretations of the civil rights acts by the Court 
followed by Congress’s corrective legislation is ultimately a waste of resources.  The Court 
should be learning its lesson and adapting its interpretive approach to these statutes 
accordingly.  See generally Schnapper, supra note 62.
280 As argued in supra note 222, Wards Cove was not a building block interpretation of 
the language at issue in Smith. Even if there were an argument that Wards Cove was a 
building block interpretation, Congress clearly indicated its disapproval of the 
interpretation, a particularly compelling reason not to find any meaning in congressional 
inaction according to Eskridge. See Eskridge, Interpreting, supra note 121, at 120.   
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claims was an open question and resulted in a circuit split, so Smith 
represented a watershed moment and starting point, rather than a 
continuation of a consistent interpretation.  In addition, following the 1991 
Act amendments to Title VII, the coherence or horizontal continuity 
between Title VII and the ADEA was not enhanced by the application of 
Wards Cove.   
Moreover, the Court should have recognized that Congress overcame 
significant obstacles of legislative inertia to pass the 1991 Act and repudiate 
Wards Cove.281 To expect that Congress could (or would) overcome those 
same obstacles to head off what, at the time, was at most a conjecture that 
Wards Cove would be applied to the ADEA asks too much of Congress.  
That is particularly true when the interest groups who are most interested in 
the fate of the ADEA did not have significant motivation to lobby for a 
similar amendment to the ADEA.   
The Court should have done the typical work of courts and interpreted 
the language of § 4(a)(2)282 – especially with reference to its interaction 
with the RFOA language in § 4(f)(1)283 – in the first instance, as it would 
have in the absence of Wards Cove. In particular, the Court should have 
recognized that the RFOA provision in the ADEA not only narrowed the 
scope of the disparate impact doctrine as applied to the ADEA,284 but also 
alleviated many of the concerns that animated the Wards Cove decision.  
Those concerns resulted in the requirement that a plaintiff disaggregate 
employer decisionmaking to identify the specific employer practice that 
causes an adverse impact, as well as the shift of the burden of proof of 
business necessity away from the employer and onto the plaintiff.  Because 
the RFOA provision allays these concerns, it was improper for the court to 
rely on Wards Cove.
For instance, the Court was concerned that “the failure to identify [a] 
specific practice being challenged is the sort of omission that could ‘result 
in employers being potentially liable for ‘the myriad of innocent causes that 
may lead to statistical imbalances . . . .’”285 Perhaps that was a valid 
concern under Title VII when Wards Cove was decided.  The fear was that 
the employer would find it exceedingly difficult to prove business necessity 
as an affirmative defense, as well as insuring that no less restrictive 
alternative could have served the same interest.286 Perhaps not.287 
281 See supra Part III.B.1.a. (discussing the inertial forces Congress was dealing with 
when enacting the 1991 Act). 
282 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (2000). 
283 Id. § 623(f)(1). 
284 Smith, 544 U.S. at 240 (“[T]he scope of disparate-impact liability under ADEA is 
narrower than under Title VII.”). 
285 Id. at 241 (quoting Wards Cove v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989)). 
286 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000). 
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Regardless, the less exacting RFOA provision makes those fears even less 
warranted.  Employers could be expected to defend, for instance, its overall 
hiring process as being reasonable, even if portions of it are not necessary 
or particularly easy to validate from a business necessity standpoint.288 
Similarly, though Wards Cove structured disparate impact claims so that 
the plaintiff-employee retained the ultimate burden of proof throughout, a 
resort to the plain text of the ADEA would suggest a different result.  The 
RFOA provision289 in the ADEA appears to be an affirmative defense to the 
“limit, segregate, or classify” language of § 4(a)(2).290 The bona fide 
occupational qualification defense,291 which is in the same subsection as the 
RFOA provision and which is written in parallel language, is an affirmative 
defense.292 If the in pari materia canon293 has any force, it should here.  In 
addition, courts have treated the RFOA as an affirmative defense in the 
disparate treatment context.294 How odd it would be if the same statutory 
provision placed the burden on different parties based on the theory of 
 
287 Clearly Congress was not wholly moved by these concerns as they relate to Title 
VII.  The 1991 Act amendments allowed a plaintiff to make a showing of disparate impact 
without pinpointing the “particular employment practice” that caused the adverse impact if 
the plaintiff “can demonstrate to the court that the elements of a[n employer’s] 
decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for analysis.”  Id.
288 See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., Docket Nos. 02-7378-cv(L), 02-
7474-cv(XAP), 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20941 at *28-*29 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2006) (finding 
that employer’s process of identifying employees to be laid off under an involuntary 
reduction in force was reasonable, in part because it was not arbitrary).  Meacham 
illuminates an interesting conundrum.  The process for determining the layoffs included 
managers’ subjective evaluations of employees’ “criticality” and “flexibility.” Id. at *27.  
The employer’s oversight of the managers’ discretion under the RIF was patchy and 
generally shoddy. Id. at *28.  Thus, it was possible, if not likely, that managers’ biases 
against older workers crept in to that subjective step.  Yet, because the process was not 
wholly arbitrary, it was reasonable and fulfilled the RFOA provision of the ADEA.  Id. at 
*29.  One is left with the impression that, under the RFOA standard, the employer is better 
off employing a subjective layoff process that incorporates popular management jargon like 
“criticality,” which opens the door for biases against older workers to take root, than 
engaging in a wholly random process, like drawing names out of a hat.  The latter is 
arbitrary and, thus, perhaps not reasonable, even though it is more effective at insulating 
employees from conscious or subtle bias..  
289 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). 
290 Id. § 623(a)(2).  See supra note 187. 
291 Id. § 623(f)(1) (“It shall not be unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action 
otherwise prohibited under [the ADEA] where age is a bona fide occupational qualification 
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business . . . .”). 
292 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 233 n.3. 
293 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
294 E.g., Criswell v. Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544, 552 (1983) (“The 
‘reasonable factors’ defense appears alongside the BFOQ exception in the ADEA and is an 
affirmative defense for which the employer bears the burden of proof.”). 
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recovery under which the parties were operating.  To treat the RFOA 
provision as allocating the burden of proof to the employee to prove that the 
employer’s practice is unreasonable contradicts prior interpretations of the 
language, ignores an important canon of construction, and – most 
disturbingly – elevates the policy preferences of the Court as announced in 
Watson and Wards Cove over the plain language of the ADEA.295 
These differences from Title VII should have led the court to recognize 
that, in the absence of a justification for a strong stare decisis rule in Smith,
the Court should not have relied on Wards Cove, but instead should have 
interpreted the language in the first instance.  Had the Court done so, it 
would have avoided the Bizarro nature of its invocation of statutory stare 
decisis and the potential problems associated with it. 
Similarly, courts should not simply presume that Price Waterhouse 
controls ADEA mixed-motives cases.  Instead, courts should recognize that 
Congress has disapproved of Price Waterhouse and that the Supreme Court 
has practically rejected Justice O’Connor’s requirement that a plaintiff 
present direct evidence of an unlawful motive.   
CONCLUSION 
In Smith the Court aimed its judicial “duplicating ray,” the consistency 
presumption, at the traditional doctrine of heightened statutory stare decisis 
and created a Bizarro brand, resuscitating an otherwise deservedly dead and 
gone Wards Cove in the process.  None of the justifications for enhanced 
statutory stare decisis supports the application of the Bizarro version.  
Instead, the criticisms of the doctrine are typically even stronger when 
applied to Bizarro statutory stare decisis.  In particular, Bizarro statutory 
stare decisis places an unwarranted burden on Congress to identify every 
possible statutory setting where a decision of the Court could have 
analogical force and amend those statutes to insure the ultimate demise of 
the disfavored interpretation.  That sort of allocation of the burden of the 
work load between the Court and the Congress is both dangerous and 
counterintuitive.  To the extent that Congress acts decisively to override the 
Court’s statutory interpretation of specific legislation, the Court should not 
feel empowered to automatically apply the repudiated interpretation in other 
contexts, forcing Congress to head off the Court’s implementation of its 
 
295 See Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., Docket Nos. 02-7378-cv(L), 02-7474-
cv(XAP), 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20941 at *17 (2d Cir. Aug. 14, 2006) (“Any other 
interpretation [than that the employee bears the burden of showing the employer’s 
justification for its practice is unreasonable] would compromise the holding in Wards Cove 
that the employer is not to bear the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to the 
‘legitimacy’ of its business justification. (emphasis added)). 
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own policy choices.  Instead, the burden should be on the Court to engage 
in real interpretation of the language.  While there may be instances in 
which the analogical force of the prior, overridden interpretation in a new 
statutory setting is so strong it should supersede Congress’s disapproval, 
Wards Cove as applied to the ADEA was not that case.  Furthermore, one 
would expect such cases to be rare.  At the very least, the Court should feel 
compelled to explain why the overridden interpretation is so appropriate in 
the subsequent statutory context, despite it earlier disapproval by Congress. 
As a result of the Courts’ use of the Bizarro version of statutory stare 
decisis in Smith, the Court has raised the specter of additional applications 
in the near future.  In the 1991 Act alone, Congress overrode a number of 
interpretations of provisions in Title VII that have analogs in the ADEA.  
Thus, each of these instances may result in the undoing of some of the work 
done by Congress in the 1991 Act, if Bizarro statutory stare decisis were 
applied as it was in Smith. The Court should instead take on the role of 
interpreting statutes in the way it normally would and not rely on rejected 
interpretations. 
The imperfect duplicate of the enhanced rule of statutory stare decisis 
that the Court invoked to apply Wards Cove in Smith is of little value.  
Bizarro statutory stare decisis upsets the balance of power and the 
appropriate workload between the Court and Congress.  It illegitimately 
excuses the Court from its duty of engaging in reasoned and well-grounded 
interpretation of statutory language.  Thus, like Bizarro in the Superman 
comics, it should be destroyed. 
 
* * *
